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VOLUME 59 FEBRUARY 1974 NUMBER 3
DRUG CONTROL IN IRAN: A LEGAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Gerald T. McLaughlin*
&
Thomas 1. Quinn**
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past few years, there has been a sharp increase in the number of
drug abusers and addicts in the United States.' Drug abuse, however, cannot be
considered a recent or a purely American phenomenon. In some countries the
problem has existed for centuries; 2 in others the problem has only mushroomed in
the past few decades. 3 With few exceptions, 4 however, there is comparatively little
literature available to American scholars on the drug situation in other countries-
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** A.B. 1947, Holy Cross; L.L.B. 1950, L.L.M. 1956, Harvard University; Professor,
Fordham University School of Law.
The research for this Article was made possible by a grant from the Fordham University
Research Council. The authors wish to thank the members of the Council and the Uni-
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1. U.S. BUuMU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERcE, STATISTIcAL ABsTRAcr OF THE
UNrrED STATES: 1971, 79, table 116.
2. Blum, A History of Opium, in SocmrY AND DRuGs 45, 45-51 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Blum, A History of Opium]. In South America, particularly in Peru and Bolivia,
the coca leaf, a stimulant, has been chewed for centuries. See McLaughlin, Cocaine: The
History and Regulation of a Dangerous Drug, 58 CoRNELL L. Ruv. 537, 538-42 (1973).
3. Blum, A History of Opium, supra note 2, at 55-56.
4. An example is EI-Kayal, Comparative Study of Narcotics and the Law in the United
Arab Republic and the United States, 20 DE PAUL 859 (1971). In addition, the United Na-
tions Bulletin on Narcotics has published some studies on drug abuse outside the United
States. Dube, Drug Abuse in Northern India, Observations Concerning the Delhi and Agra
Regions, 24 BULL. NARc., Jan.-March, 1972, at 49 (India); Esbjornso, The Drug Problem
in Sweden From the Police Point of View, 23 BULL. NA ac., Jan.-March, 1971, at 15 (Swe-
den); Goduco-Auglar, A Note on Drug Abuse in the Philippines, 24 BULL. NARc., April-June,
1972, at 43 (Philippines); Jermulowicz & Turnau, Control and Treatment of Drug Addicts
in Israel, 14 BULL. NARc., April-June, 1962, at 11 (Israel); Johnson-Romuald, Narcotics Con-
trol in the Republic of Togo, 21 BULL. NAMc., Jan.-March, 1969, at 41 (Togo); Keilholz,
Present Problems of Drug Dependence in Switzerland, 22 BuLL. NAc., April-June, 1970, at
1 (Switzerland); Maddedu & Malagolie, Drug Dependence in Italy: Some Statistical, Clini-
cal and Social Observations, 22 BULL. N.Ac.,,April-Dec., 1970, at 1 (Italy); Nimb, The Con-
literature that might be suggestive of new approaches to the drug problem in
the United States. This Article attempts to fill that void, at least in part, by
describing in detail the history and character of drug abuse in one country-Iran.
Iran was chosen primarily for five reasons. First of all, the extent of addiction
in the country was, until very recently, staggering. In 1955, for example, out
of a population of approximately 20 million people, it was estimated that there
were 1.5 million addicts, roughly seven percent of the population.5 This situa-
tion can be contrasted with the United States where, although estimates of the
addict population vary, few would seriously contend that it exceeds one percent
of the population as a whole.0 Second, since 1955, Iran has succeeded in reduc-
ing its addict population to approximately 400,000, or roughly one percent of the
present population.7 Third, Iran is an ideal country to study the ways in which
changes in the law affect the patterns and character of drug abuse. In the past
20 years, for example, the Iranian government has moved from a laissez-faire policy
regarding drug abuse, to a ban on all drug consumption, and finally to a massive
drug maintenance program for registered addicts.8 Fourth, in order to solve its
addiction problem, Iran has actively experimented with drug control measures
that either have not been tried or are just being attempted in the United States.9
Of course some of these approaches, such as military trials for drug traffickers,
would doubtlessly be unconstitutional in the United States. 10 Other techniques,
sumption of Narcotic Drugs in Denamrk, 10 BULL. N~Ac., July-Sept., 1958, at 1 (Denmark);
Nogahama, A Review of Drug Abuse and Counter Measures in Japan Since World War 1I,
20 BULL. NARC., July-Sept., 1969, at 19 (Japan); Panameno, Drug Abuse in El Salvador, 24
BULL. NARc., July-Sept., 1972, at 37 (El Salvador).
5. H. Azarakhsh, The Nature and Extent of Drug Addiction in Iran 3 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Azarakhsh, Naturel. Other estimates put the number of addicts in 1955 at
between 2,000,000 and 2,800,000. WILBER, IRAN PAST AND PREsENT 230 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as WILBER]; Wright, The Battle Against Opium in Iran-A Record of Progress, 10
BULL. NARc., April-June, 1958, at 8, 9-10.
Iran has been called "the largest consumer of illicit opium in the world." Holahan, The
Economics of Heroin, in DEALING wrr DRUG ABusE 260 (1972).
6. With a population in excess of 200,000,000 people an addict population of even one
percent would equal 2,000,000. Estimates of the number of American heroin addicts usually
range between 150,000 and 600,000. Wald & Hutt, The Drug Abuse Survey Project: Sum-
mary of Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations, in DEALING wrrH DRUG ABusE 4
(1972). For figures on the extent of all forms of illicit drug use in the United States (as
opposed to heroin addiction statistics) see NATIONAL COMM'N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG
ABusE, DRUG Usa IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 63 (1973).
7. U.S. CABINET COMM. ON INT'L NARcoTIcs CONTROL, WORLD OPIUM SURVEY A12
(1972) [hereinafter cited as WoRLi OPIUM SuRvE ]. Iranian government estimates tend to
be lower, between 200,000 and 300,000 opium addicts. Azarakhsh, Nature, supra note 5,
at 3. See also Kamm, They shoot opium smugglers in Iran, but . . . ., New York Times
Sunday Magazine, Feb. 11, 1973, at 42, 43 [hereinafter cited as Kamm].
8. See notes 110-479 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 297-466 infra and accompanying text.
10. Justice Douglas writing for the majority in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 262
(1969), states:
If the case does not arise "in the land or naval forces," then the accused getsfirst, the benefit of an indictment by a grand jury and second, a trial by jury before
a civilian court as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and by Art. , § 2, of the
Constitution ....
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such as mandatory school expulsion for addicted students, might be politically
infeasible. But much can be learned from a comparison of Iran's massive opium
maintenance program and the controversial methadone maintenance program in
the United States.11  Finally, Iran, like the United States, is a "victim country. 1"
There is an active smuggling network which brings drugs into Iran from neighbor-
ing countries such as Afghanistan and Turkey.13 Thus, in order to solve its in-
ternal drug situation, Iran must depend upon international and regional coopera-
tion-something which has not been forthcoming in the past.14
There are, of course, many dissimilarities between drug abuse in Iran and in
the United States. The social environments of American and Iranian addicts are
markedly dissimilar.15 What is more, the drugs abused differ. In Iran, for ex-
ample, opium is the major cause of concern;1 6 in the United States it is heroin.',
Granting these dissimilarities, however, the Iranian experience in attempting to
control drug abuse is instructive for all those interested in the problem of addiction
in this country. As will be shown in this Article, Iran has made a continuous,
sincere, and often painful effort to deal with its drug abuse problem. It is with the
belief that other countries with drug abuse problems, and especially the United
States, will be able to build upon the knowledge gained by hard experience in Iran,
that this Article is presented.
In order to describe and evaluate the Iranian experiment, this Article will
be divided into three parts. Part one will outline the types of drugs abused in
Iran in order to establish the context within which the drug laws operate. The
second part will trace the history of drug addiction and control in Iran from its
earliest beginnings until 1973. Finally, part three will provide an overall evalua-
tion of Iran's efforts to control drug abuse.
II. DRUGS OF ABUSE IN IRAN
Although there may be occasional instances of barbiturate or cocaine abuse,' 8
there are basically four drugs which are illegally consumed in Iran: opium, shireh,
heroin, and hashish.
11. A brief description of the origin of the methadone treatment program in the United
States can be found in D. LouRA, THE DRUG SCENE 179-82 (1968); D. MusTo, THE AmPiu-
CAN Dis.AsE 237-41 (1973).
12. WoRLD OPium SuRvey 18-25.
13. Id. at 30-31.
14. The Fight Against Narcotics, IRAN FACTs AND FiGuRES 1, 5 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as The Fight Against Narcotics].
15. For a discussion of the importance of social environment in dealing with problems
of addiction see E. ScHuR, NARcoTIc ADDICnON iN BRrrmN AND AmERicA 35-42 (1962).
Finestone, Cats, Kicks and Color, 5 SociAL PROLEMS 6 (1957) contains an excellent descrip-
tion of a social milieu giving rise to drug addiction in America.
16. WoRmD Opnm SuRvEY All.
17. Einstein, The Addiction Dilemma: Gaps in Knowledge, Information-Dissemination,
Service and Training, in DRuG DEPENDENCE AND ABUSE REsoURCE BooK 107, 108 (1971).
18. For mention of cocaine abuse during the 1950's see J. Noorbakhsh, Detection, Treat-
ment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Drug Addicts 1 (April 14, 1966) [hereinafter cited as
Noorbakhshl. For mention of barbituate abuse see notes 106-07 infra.
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A. Opium
By far the most widely abused drug in Iran is opium.19 Produced from a spe-
cies of the poppy (papaver soniniferum),20 opium is a valuable cash crop in many
areas in the world.21 Statistics show that in Turkey, for instance, the money
yield per hectare (approximately two and one-half acres) of opium far exceeds
that of alfalfa, wheat, barley, and sugar beets. 22 When grown legally, opium is
used to produce morphine and codeine for legitimate medical needs. 23 When
grown illegally, or diverted from the legal traffic, opium is used to produce black
market heroin or to supply the needs of the illicit opium trade.24
1. Cultivation of the Opium Poppy
The cultivation of the opium. poppy is not an easy occupation; the crop is sea-
sonal, requiring constant tending and a large supply of cheap but skilled labor.25
The poppy fields are first sown by hand.26 Although the seeds do best in a some-
what dry, warm climate, they do require "a moderate amount of water before and
during the early stages of growth. '" 27 As a consequence the sowing in Iran gener-
ally takes place in autumn because it is between November and April that rainfall
is most plentiful. 28 Once the poppies begin to grow, they need regular care.
The poppy needs thinning and requires several hoeings and weedings during its
growth cycle because it grows more slowly than weeds and leafy vegetables and
is therefore a poor competitor for available soil nutrients and sunlight. 29
In Iran the harvesting of the opium fields usually begins in May. 30 By this
19. WORLD OPIuM SuRVEY All,
20. There are many colorful explanations for the origins of the opium poppy. According
to Buddhist legend, for example, "the opium poppy was born on the very spot where Bud-
dha's eyelids fell when he cut them off to prevent sleep from overtaking him." Grannier-
Doyeux, From Opium to LSD, The Long History of Drugs, 21 UNESCO CoURMR, May, 1968,
at 8, 9.
21. WORLD OPIum SURVEY 5-10.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Id. at 5-6.
24. Id.
25. It has been estimated that it takes 30 days of teamwork and 260 manpower days
to cultivate one hectare of poppies. Kusevic, Cultivation of the Opium Poppy and Opium
Production in Yugoslavia, 12 BULL. NARc., April-June, 1960, at 9.
26. WORLD OPiuM SURVEY 4.
27. Id. at 3.
28. See NELIGAN, THE OPIUM QUESTION WITH SPEcIAL REFERENcE TO PERSiA 14 (1927)
[hereinafter cited as NELIGAN]. For reference to the rainfall in Iran between November
and April see WMBER, supra note 5, at 10-11. The autumn poppy is considered harder and
produces a higher drug yield than the spring poppy. The Opium Poppy, 5 BULL. NARc.,
July-Sept., 1953, at 11.
29. WORLD OPiuM SuRvny 4.
30. This information was obtained from officials in Teheran. During January, 1973, the
authors visited Teheran and had extended discussions with Iranian, United Nations, and
American officials stationed there who were knowledgeable in the drug field. In addition
the authors discussed the problems of Iranian addiction with Iranian and American officials
in Washington, D.C. and with United Nations officials in New York City and Geneva, Swit-
zerland. Much of the information presented in this Article was based on these discussions
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time the poppy should have reached maturity and acquired anywhere from five
to twenty pods per plant.3' The collection of the latex from these pods is probably
the most critical point in the opium production process, requiring good weather
and large amounts of manual labor.32 Determining the appropriate time to begin
the harvest is often difficult, and if the four to six day period during which the
latex can be collected is allowed to pass, there may be no yield at all. 33 The ex-
perienced opium cultivator will begin to harvest the plants shortly after the petals
of the white opium blossoms have fallen, just as the pods are coming to maturity.34
At harvest time35 the pod is cut by a laborer and the latex is allowed to seep
from the pod, turning a dark brown color as it dries. Eight to 14 hours later the
dried latex is scraped from the pod.8 6 It is possible to make more than one inci-
sion in each capsule, but the percentage of morphine in the latex decreases.37
Both the cutting and the scraping of the latex from the pod require a worker
skilled in his trade if the harvest is to be successful. 38 Weather during the harvest
is critical because the latex is vulnerable to the vagaries of climatic change.
As one commentator remarked, "If exposed to a hot sun the latex melts, drops
off the capsule and is lost; if rain falls, it is washed off; cold lessens the yield." 39
Once the latex has been collected from the field it is in a form known as "raw
opium"4 which is usually formed into dark brown cakes between five and six
inches long which weigh one pound.4- Oftentimes a further process takes place
to convert raw opium into stick opium. The raw opium is cooked to reduce the
moisture content further; then the opium is manipulated and rolled into sticks,
and is ready for use.42
Although the poppy is principally grown for the latex it produces, there are
and the authors' own field observations. Citations referring to this material will be indicated
by the words "field study."
31. WORLD OPIUM SuRVEy 4. Some would argue that the poppy plants should be kept
so tended that only three or four pods would be allowed to mature in order to enhance better
development. The Opium Poppy, supra note 28, at 11.
32. NELIGAN, supra note 28, at 15; WoRLD OPIUM SuRVEY 4.
33. See Kusevic, supra note 25, at 7-8.
34. NELIGAN, supra note 28, at 14. Usually after the poppy flowers fall, the capsules
continue to mature, and become ripe in about two weeks. The Opium Poppy, supra note
28, at 11. The actual period during which the latex can be most successfully collected does
not exceed four to six days. Kusevic, supra note 25, at 7-8.
35. For a description of the harvest see WORLD Opium SuRvEy 4; Kusevic, supra note
25.
36. The Opium Poppy, supra note 28, at 12.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 11-12.
39. NELIGAN, supra note 28, at 15. See also Government of India, Ministry of Finance,
Report on the Operations of the Narcotics Department for the Year Ending September 30,
1958, at 1. This Report contains a description of what sun and rain can do to the opium
crop.
40. Shevelev, Bankovsky & Muravyova, Mechanical Drying of Raw Opium, 10 BULL.
NARc., April-June, 1958, at 6.
41. NELIGAN, supra note 28, at 15.
42. Id. at 18.
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many other uses which can be made of the opium plant.43  The seeds are edible
and can be used for the preparation of pastries and breads.4" The oil from the
seeds is also used for human consumption.45 Oil varnishes, soaps, perfumes and
other similar substances are made from the flower juices. 46 The oil cake pro-
duced from the seeds makes both good cattle feed and fertilizer.47
From the description of opium cultivation, one can understand why it is such
a highly visible occupation and one which poses special problems for the illegal
cultivator. First, the harvest may take from two weeks to two months and require
many workers, thereby increasing the chances of detection. "8  Second, the opium
farmer is totally at the mercy of the climate; he must hope that rain or extreme
temperature changes do not occur during the harvest.49 As we shall see later, these
difficulties have enabled the government to control quite successfully attempts at
illegal cultivation in Iran.
2. The Uses of Opium
For centuries, opium has been variously used as a relaxant and as a medi-
cine.50 In areas where there are few doctors, opium has traditionally served
as a panacea to relieve the symptoms of many painful diseases.51 For example,
in Iran and other countries opium has often been employed to cure the diarrhea
and intestinal pain associated with water-borne dysenteries.52 It has also com-
monly been used to alleviate the pain of malaria.53 In fact, much of the addic-
tion in Iran has been attributed to the use of opium for self-medication.54 Even
in the modern pharmacopoeia, two opium alkaloids still retain an important place
-morphine as an anqsthetic and codeine as a cough suppressant. 5
43. For reference to some of the many uses of the poppy plant see The Opium Poppy,
supra note 28, at 12.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Dried opium plants or poppy straw are regularly used to produce morphine which
in turn is used to manufacture ceitain pharmaceuticals. The commercial manufacture of
morphine from poppy straw was begun in Hungary during the 1920's. The Manufacture of
Morphine from Poppy Straw, 5 BULL. NARc., July-Sept., 1953, at 16.
48. WORLD OpiuM SURVEY 4.
49. See Report on the Operations of the Narcotics Department for the Year Ending Sep-
tember 30, 1958, supra note 39, at 1.
50. BRECHER, LicIT AND ILLIcrr DRUGS, THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON NARcoTIcs,
STIMULANTS, DEPRESSANTS, INHALANTS, HALLUCINOGENS, AND MAIUHIUANA-NCLUDING CAF-
FEINE, NIcoTINE AND ALCOHOL 8-9 (1972); WORLD OPium SURVEY 2.
51. WORLD OPIUM SURVEY 2; Quasi-Medical Use of Opium, 5 BULL. NAnc., July-Sept.,
1953, at 19.
52. For reference to the use of opium and other opiates to control dysentery see
BREcHER, supra note 50, at 8.
53. Opium has also been used as a preventive remedy against malaria. Quasi-Medical
Use of Opium, 5 BULL. NARC., July-Sept., 1953, at 19.
54. WILBER, supra note 5, at 173.
55. It has been said that medicine could not get along without opium (and, of course,
its derivatives). ". . . Wlithout opium, medicine would be like a one-armed man." Hear-
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a. Opium Smoking
It has been reported that most illicit opium users in Iran prefer to consume
the drug by smoking. 58 On this subject one commentator has remarked:
Opium smoking is a fairly complicated operation which takes a lot of preparation
and equipment. Generally the pipe is made of a bamboo stem with a clay bowl.
The smoker lies down. With a needle, he takes from a box of opium a little lump
of chandu which is a specially prepared opium extract. The chandu is then dried
over the flame of a lmp and rubbed between thumb and index finger into a ball
which is then placed in the bowl. The pipe is ready. The smoker lights it and
slowly inhales the smoke.
57
Smokers prefer prepared or stick opium (chandu) because foreign objects which
might still remain in raw opium have been removed and thus there is less chance
that the opium pipe will become clogged. 58
The user may smoke his pipe at home or in an "opium den," which, lurid over-
tones aside, is simply a place where smokers congregate to take their opium. 9
A smoker may require as much as five grams of opium a day,60 and, since
opium is a physically addicting drug, continued use creates a body tolerance,
requiring increased dosages to obtain the euphoric effects.6 The addict will suffer
withdrawal symptoms if use of the drug is discontinued.62
b. Opium Eating
In Iran "opium eating" is generally less common than opium smoking.6 3 "Opium
eating" is something of a misnomer, however, since addicts who "eat" opium fre-
quently drink it in liquid form.6 4 The habit of eating opium seems to be par-
ticularly prevalent among older men-possibly because the drug reputedly dilates
the arteries and helps blood circulationA5 On the other hand, many people be-
lieve that opium eating causes constipation. 66
Although continued use of opium will ultimately lead to drug dependence, it
does not necessarily mean that the addict will manifest any adverse effects.67 For
ings Before the Committee on Ways & Means House of Representatives on Taxation of Mari-
huana, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1937).
56. Fort, A World View of Drugs, in SocmTr AND DRUGS 229, 236 (1969).
57. Grannier-Doyeux, supra note 20, at 10-11.
58. NELiGAN, supra note 28, at 18.
59. An opium den is sometimes called a divan. In these dens, the management provides
the addict with his drug and paraphernalia for smoking. HEss, CHASING THE DRAGON, A RE-
PORT ON DRUG ADDICTION N HONG KONG 45 (1965). Opium dens existed in many cities
of the United States until the 1930's. BREcmm, supra note 50, at 45. Opium is not the
only drug consumed in special houses. There existed in the United States during the 1920's
marihuana "tea pads" where a smoker could go to smoke his drug. Id. at 410.
60. Noorbakhsh, supra note 18, at 1.
61. A. LINDmEsmrH, OPIATE ADDICTON 28.
62. Id.
63. See authority cited note 56 supra.
64. BREcHER, supra note 50, at 5.
65. NEuGAN, supra note 28, at 24.
66. BRECHmr, supra note 50, at 31; Field study.
67. There is considerable support for the theory that opiate addicts maintain what could
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long periods of time-and in some cases for entire lifetimes-opium addicts can
be productive members of society. 68 According to some Iranian observers, how-
ever, advanced stages of opium dependence are characterized by apathy, loss of
self-confidence, suspiciousness, and unreliability. 9 In addition, when serious ad-
diction develops, the addict's health will begin to deteriorate, accompanied by
weight loss and fatigue, which are among the most common signs of addiction.' 0
Since his resistance to disease seems also to be reduced, the addict is considered
a bad subject for surgery. 7 '
B. Shireh
Shireh, which is simply a form of burnt opium,7 2 could have been properly
included in the general discussion of opium. Because it is so much more potent
than raw or prepared opium, 73 however, shireh is treated as a separate drug.
The burnt opium which is left in an opium pipe after smoking is called "sokhte."
This residue is collected and mixed with quantities of raw opium and water.
The result of the mixing is a black material called "shireh," which in turn is
usually smoked. Some individuals prefer to smoke shireh because it is much
more potent than prepared opium. While raw or prepared opium may have a
morphine content of approximately 10 percent,74 its shireh derivative has a mor-
phine content of approximately 16 to 18 percent. Although shireh smoking is a
common practice, there are no reliable estimates of the number of shireh smokers
currently in Iran.
C. Heroin
Although developed during the 1870's, heroin was first marketed by the Ger-
man pharmaceutical firm of Bayer and Company in 1898. 7r As with cocaine
be considered a very normal life style which is disrupted by their addiction only if they can-
not obtain the drugs. See LiNDEsMin, supra note 61, at 31-36.
68. In speaking of American drug addiction, one commentator remarked: "[lit is quite
well known that many drug users have carried on for many years in occupations requiring
skill and intelligence, as for example, the medical profession." Lindesmith, "Dope Fiend"
Mythology, 31 J. Canm. L. & C. 199, 201 (1940). For a description of "some eminent nar-
cotics addicts" see BRECHER, supra note 50, at 33-41.
69. Field study. "IThe belief that a drug addict automatically becomes a moral degen-
erate, liar, thief, etc., because of the direct influence of the drug, is simply nonsense quite
on a par with a belief in witchcraft." Lindesmith, supra note 68, at 202.
70. Radji, Opium Control in Iran-A New Regime, 11 BULL. NARc., Jan.-March, 1959,
at 1.
71. NELIGAN, supra note 28, at 112.
72. Field study. In the United States, shireh is often called by its Chinese name, Yen-
shee. See LNmEsMrr, supra note 61, at 220.
73. There appears to be little literature of general circulation dealing with the use of
shireh. The information upon which this description is based was obtained in interviews
with officials in Teheran.
74. The United States Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control reports the
morphine content of Iranian opium to be between 9 and 12 percent. WoRM OPIUM SURVEY
A13.
75. R. LiNGEMAN, DRUGs FRoi.t A To Z: A DicnONARY 99 (1969). The word "her-
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before it, heroin was early thought to be non-addictive and an antidote for mor-
phine addiction.7 6 It was later learned that the new drug also caused serious
addiction. 7  In order to understand heroin abuse in general, and Iranian heroin
abuse in particular, some remarks must be made about how the drug is produced.
1. The Production of Heroin
Morphine is the common element of opium and heroin which acts directly
upon the central nervous system, and produces euphoric states.78 Raw opium has
a morphine content of 5-14 percent, and is converted into morphine base, with a
morphine content of 50-70 percent, before undergoing processing to produce
heroin.7 9  The morphine base is usually smuggled into Iran from Turkey 0 and
converted into heroin by "heroin chemists," who usually have learned their trade
from helping other such "chemists.18 1  The ease with which such a laboratory can
be established and maintained can be seen from the following description of the
basic operation.
The process of converting opium into heroin in the so-called laboratories "is no
more complex than making bootleg whiskey in the United States. '8 2 The process
does not involve high temperatures or pressures, and the equipment required is not
complex. The chemicals used are common industrial ones. The only other re-
sources necessary are a modest amount of electric power, and an ample supply of
water.8 3
... Mhe operations at each stage are simple ones of soaking, filtering, heating,precipitating, drying, and crushing. The basic equipment required is inexpensive
and can be quite primitive: enamel pots or copper vats, strainers and filters, pans
and trays, and a simple heat source.8 4
Most of the heroin manufacturing in Iran takes place in the northwest near Tabriz
and Malayer-close to the morphine base supplies in Turkey.85  In 1971 almost
all of the heroin seized in Iran was either captured in the city of Teheran or in
Azerbaijan province in the northwest.8 6
oin" is derived from heroisch, which in German medical terminology means large or powerful.
Id.
76. Id. Heroin was quickly accepted into the medical pharmacopoeia. For instance,
Austria became the first country to make heroin an official drug. The United States fol-
lowed suit in 1910 but withdrew the drug from its pharmacopoeia in 1920. Heroin in the
Official Pharmacopoeia, 5 BULL. NARc., April-June, 1953, at 19.
77. R. LINoEmA , supra note 75, at 99.
78. Id. at 99, 174.
79. Woxu-n OPiu Sutvny 14-15.
80. See United Nations Econmic and Social Council, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Re-
port of the Ad Hoc Committee on Illicit Traffic in the Near and Middle East 1971-1972,
at 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/550 E/CN.7/AC.10/1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ad Hoe Com-
mittee Report].
81. WORLD OPIUm Suavny 15.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 13.
86. Report of the Government of Iran to the United Nations for the Calendar Year 1971
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2. The Uses of Heroin in Iran
Consistent with their preferred method of taking opium, Iranians generally
smoke heroin. The heroin is placed on a piece of tinfoil and a match is lit under
it, causing the heroin to oxidie. The fumes are then inhaled. The manner of
inhalation varies and has generated a number of colorful expressions, such as
"chasing the dragon" and "playing the mouth organ."sT In "chasing the drag-
on," for example, the addict employs a rolled piece of paper as an inhaling tube.
One end of the tube is placed in the smoker's mouth; the other follows the wisps
of heroin smoke emerging from the sliver foil. These heroin fumes allegedly
"resemble the undulating tail of the dragon in Chinese mythology."88  In a bow
to modern technology, the Iranian heroin addict has found a new use for the ball-
point pen. He simply removes the inner ink cartridge and uses the barrel in
place of the older strip of rolled paper.89 From all reports, there is little evidence
that heroin is intravenously injected as is often done in the United States.9 0
Heroin addiction is a rather recent phenomenon in Iran. It was not until ap-
proximately 1960 that heroin began to appear in substantial amounts.91 By all
reports, however, heroin addiction is rapidly increasing. The government es-
timates that there are presently 10,000 heroin addicts in the country, most be-
tween 20 and 40 years of age, and principally concentrated in the larger cities of
Iran.9 2 Other estimates place the number higher-possibly at 50,000.93
To support the daily habits of even 10,000 addicts for one year would require
(at the rate of one-quarter gram of heroin per addict per day) in excess of 900
kilograms of heroin.9 4 Since annual seizures of heroin have averaged approxi-
on the Working of the International Treaties on Narcotics Drugs, 1971, at 16, U.N. Doe.
E/CN.7/SR.621 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report]. More specifically, of the total
1971 heroin seizures of 32 kilograms 500 grams, 14 kilograms 600 grams were seized in
Teheran and 15 kilograms 300 grams in Azerbaijan. Id.
87. "Chasing the Dragon" is explained in the text. "Playing the mouth organ" is a
method of inhaling the opium fumes through a matchbox cover-the inhaling action resem-
bling playing a mouth organ. A third method of inhalation is called "firing the ack-ack
gun." Heroin is placed on the top of a cigarette which is then lit and the heroin fumes
inhaled. HEss, supra note 59, at 43-44.
88. Id. at 44.
89. Field study.
90. Curnock, Chasing the Dragon, 7 IRAN TAMuNE, May, 1972, at 14, 15. Intravenous
injection of heroin is rare in most areas of Asia. HEss, supra note 59, at 79.
91. Ad Hoe Committee Report. supra note 80, at 12. But there is reference to plentiful
supplies of heroin existing in Iran during the early 1950's. PAYNE, IouRmNY TO PERSmI 57
(1951). The appearance of heroin throughout Asia during the 1950's was a widespread oc-
currence. HESS, supra note 59, at 146.
92. Ad Hoe Committee Reporil; supra note 80, at 12. For a reference to the age of
heroin addicts in Iran see Curnock, supra note 90, at 15.
93. WoRLD OPIUM SuRVEY A12.
94. One Iranian expert has estimated that a heroin smoker will use one-quarter gram per
day, Curnock, supra note 90, at 15. Others, however, would contend that the yearly require-
ment of Iran's heroin addicts is much less. In 1969, for example, an Iranian law enforce-
ment official estimated that the daily need of the heroin addict was only five centigrams
or one-twentieth of a gram. That would mean that Iran's 10,000 heroin addicts require only
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mately 35 kilograms for the period 1969 to 1971,95 it is clear that government
law enforcement agencies are intercepting only a fraction of the contraband heroin
in the country. Even if the estimated annual consumption requirement were
halved, the fact would still remain that only a small portion of the heroin cir-
culating in the country is being seized.
D. Hashish
The last drug to be discussed is hashish or charas-the pure resinous extract
of the female hemp plant, cannabis sativa.9 6 When extracted, the resin hardens
and turns a brown color: the darker the color, the more potent the drug.97
Hashish is up to eight times more potent than marijuana, which is made from the
flowering tops, stems, and leaves of the same hemp plant.9 8
When smoked or eaten, hashish has an hallucinogenic effect on the user, often-
times enhancing his sensual perceptions. "[E]ffects include distorted perceptions
of various parts of the body, depersonalization . . . spatial and time distortions,
intensification of scents, tastes, colors and sounds, [and] visual hallucinations." 99
The use of hashish, however, can produce acute psychosis in certain individuals,
although it does not seem to be addictive in the sense of causing body tolerance
or withdrawal. 100
Although grown in certain areas of the country, Iranian hashish is, as one com-
mentator puts it, "too mild for anything mind-bending."' 101 The best quality
hashish found in Iran comes from its eastern neighbor, Afghanistan.10 2 Although
Afghan hashish passes through Iran bound for European markets, presumably
a limited amount stays in the country. 0 3 However, because it is more expensive
than opium, hashish use tends to be a vice of the wealthier classes.' 04 Indeed,
the use of hashish may have been popularized by Iranian students returning from
abroad. 105
180 kilograms a year to support their habits. 3 IRAN TRmUNE July, 1969, at 13. It has
been estimated that a heroin addict in America uses 55 milligrams of pure heroin each day.
Holahan, The Economics of Heroin, in DEALING wrr DRUG ABUSE 255, 290 (1972).
95. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 2. Seizures of heroin in 1971 were 32 kilograms
555 grams; in 1970, 39 kilograms 31 grams; and in 1969, 35 kilograms 337 grams. Id.
96. R. LiNGEmAN, supra note 75, at 94. The name "hashish" has a romantic derivation.
It allegedly comes from the name Hassan-ibn-al-Sabbah who was the leader of the Assassins,
an eleventh century band of terrorists in Persia. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. A new liquid form of hashish has appeared in Afghanistan, and is reputed to
be more potent than the usual solid forms. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1972, at 10, col. 3. None
of this liquid hashish has as yet been uncovered in Iran, however. Ad Hoe Committee
Report, supra note 80, at 14.
99. R. LiNGEmAN, supra note 75, at 94.
100. Id. at 96.
101. The Hippie as the Hobo in Teheran, 2 IRAN TRmUNE, April, 1969, at 36, 38.
102. Id. at 38. During 1969, the word "Afghan" became a code name for hashish and
other drugs in Iran. Id.
103. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 13.
104. Field study.
105. For the proposition that hashish is used by foreign-educated Iranian youths see
Kamm, supra note 7, at 44.
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E. Miscellaneous Drugs
Barbiturate and amphetamine abuse do not seem to be serious problems in
Iran at the present time, although there are recent indications that barbiturate
abuse is on the rise. For example, two deaths in Teheran were recently attributed
to overdoses of barbiturates. 10 6 Since barbiturates are often used in conjunction
with heroin, it is possible that barbiturate abuse may grow significantly as the
heroin problem in Iran increases. 10 7 As for cocaine and marijuana, they are for
all practical purposes non-existent.' 0 8 Although forbidden by the Koran, there
seems to be growing evidence of widespread use of alcohol among certain urban
groups in Iran.1 9 With this analysis of commonly abused drugs as a background,
we shall now proceed to describe in some detail the history of drug abuse and
control in Iran.
I. A HISTORY OF IRANIAN DRUG CONTROL:
EAmY BEGINNINGS TO 1973
A. Before 1800
It is unclear precisely when opium was first introduced into what is now Iran.
It certainly was known as far back as 4000 B.C. by the Sumerians who lived in
neighboring Iraq."10 The Assyrians used it as medicine in the seventh century
B.C."' At the time of Alexander the Great's conquest of Persia in the fourth
century B.C., the Greeks obviously knew about opium, since Hippocrates had de-
scribed the medicinal properties of the drug years before. 1 2 In the first century
B.C., Mithdridates VI, King of Pontus in Asia Minor, used opium regularly,
believing it to be a panacea for -all ailments."13
Although surrounded by these cultures which knew and used opium, there is no
reference to the drug in Persian writings of this early period. Indeed, the first
clear reference to the drug in a. Persian text does not occur until the sixth century
A.D."14 It is believed that about this time Arab traders were generally responsible
106. Field study. The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Illicit Traffic in the Near
and Middle East has reported somo barbiturate use in Iran. Ad Hoc Committee Report, su-
pra note 80, at 12.
107. It has been estimated that approximately one third of all American heroin addicts
also use barbiturates. R. LINGEMAN, supra note 75, at 18. Barbiturates are used in Hong
Kong to adulterate heroin. HEss, supra note 59, at 35.
108. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 6, 13. Some marihuana use has been reported.
Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 12.
109. Field study; Kamm, supra note 7, at 44. There is some drinking of alcoholic bev-
erages among nomadic tribes, however. ARASTmi & ARASTEI, MAN AND Socmry iN IRAN
155 (1970).
110. Blum, A History of Opium, supra note 28, at 45.
111. NELIGAN, supra note 28, at 2.
112. On Hippocrates' familiarity with opium see Wood, Dope: The Story of the Use and
Abuse of Opium, 103 AMER. J. Psut. 16, 18 (Jan. 1973).
113. NELIGAN, supra note 28, at 3. See also TInlNG, THE POPPY PLAGUE AND ENOLANm'S
Cnmn! 4 (1876).
114. NELIOAN, supra note 28, at 2. Betal nut chewing, a form of drug use similar to coca
leaf chewing in South America, was also quite popular in Iran at this time. BLUM, SocmT
AND DRuas 106 (1969).
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for the diffusion of opium use." 5 In the seventh century A.D., with the advent
of Mohammedanism and the Arab conquest of the Persian Empire, presumably
knowledge about the drug spread. In the tenth century A.D., two famous Persian
physicians, Razi and Avicenna, prepared clinical studies of opium, detailing the
various ways in which the drug could be used. B6  Although both doctors pre-
sumably recognized that prolonged use of opium could lead to addiction, Avicenna
may not have been sufficiently careful in his personal use of opium-some his-
torians claim that he died from opium intoxication in 1037.1 7
It is believed that opium has been widely used in Iran for at least the last 600
years.1" 8  However, this wide-spread use can be documented only from the early
part of the 16th century." 9 Apparently opium was widely used by persons of
wealth as a form of self-medication which, it was hoped, would give them extra-
ordinary powers.' 20  It was common to brew poppies in water and then to drink
the liquid like tea. This concoction, called "kooknar," was particularly popular
in the royal capital of Isfahan.' 2 '
Opium smoking arrived rather late in Iran. The practice was popular in the
Far East and had become a serious problem in China by the 17th century,122 but
did not reach Iran until the second half of the 19th century.'2 3  At the same
time smoking was introduced, hygienic and economic conditions combined to create
a situation in which opium smoking soon reached virtually epidemic proportions.' 24
B. 1800-1900
It has been said of Iran that, "[t]he 19th century could be called the century of
widespread use of [opium] in the country."'125 The causes of increased use and
addiction can be divided into two categories, economic and hygienic.
1. Economic Causes
In the 1850's millions of Chinese were opium smokers and commerce in the
drug was a major international enterprise.126 The two so-called Opium Wars of
1842 and 1858 involving England and China had assured at least a temporary
end to Chinese resistance to the importation of opium,' 27 and the Iranians found
that they "could not be indifferent" to the possibilities for enhancing their econ-
115. WORLD OPium SuRvEY 1.
116. Azarakhsh, Nature, supra note 5, at 1.
117. Grannier-Doyeux, supra note 20, at 9.
118. M. Saba, Detection, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Narcotic Drug Addicts (April
14, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Saba].
119. Azarakhsh, Nature, supra note 5, at 1.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. WORLD OPIUM SunvnY 1.
123. Azarakhsh, Nature, supra note 5, at 2.
124. Id.
125. Saba, supra note 118, at 1.
126. Blum, A History of Opium, supra note 2, at 51.
127. Id. at 52.
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omy. 128 In addition, European civilization was beginning to make an impact
upon Iran, and there was a need for foreign currency to facilitate the acquisition
of European goods.' 29 The opium trade appeared as the best source of the
needed currency, and, as a result, poppy cultivation was undertaken extensively
in Iran in order to provide the quantities of opium needed for Iran's new role in
international commerce. 130  The program was so successful that widespread crop
substitution of opium for wheat caused a famine in 1870-72.131 Even with these
economic dislocations, however, exports of opium rose from 20 tons in 1859 to
over 400 tons by 1914.132 Of course, the increased production of opium aided
domestic consumption by greatly increasing the drug's availability.
2. Hygienic Causes
The fact that the first medical school in Iran was not built until 1850133 gives
some indication of the state of the art for that country during the period under
discussion. There are a large number of small farming communities in Iran
which exist wherever an adequate water supply can be found, and "by far the
largest number are hidden away in remote mountain valleys."' 3 4 Even today the
villagers have minimal contact with the outside world and very limited access to
medical facilities, and water- and food-borne diseases such as typhoid fever and
amoebic dysentery are said to be endemic.' 35 Thus, it is not surprising that,
when the opportunity presented itself, those who could not obtain more orthodox
medical treatment turned to opium to alleviate the pain of disease and sickness.13,
Thus we see that by the beginning of the 20th century the use of opium was
well established in Iran, spurred by strongly felt economic and quasi-medical needs.
However, as shall be discussed in the next section, opposition to widespread opium
use began to grow, and Iran would soon undertake the long struggle to reverse the
processes that had been set in motion in the 19th century.' 37
128. H. Azarakhsh, Drug Addiction in Iran 2 [hereinafter cited as Akarakhsh, Drug].
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. NnLrGAN, supra note 28, at 13.
132. See id. at 39.
133. Azarakhsh, Drug, supra note 128, at 1.
134. WILDER, supra note 5, at 169.
135. Id. at 173, 209.
136. Id. at 173.
137. Two other theories have teen advanced for the spread of addiction at about this
time. First, the American Civil War may have had an indirect effect on the spread of addic-
tion in Iran. During the Civil War, cotton cultivation in Iran was increased because, with
American cotton off the world market, other sources of cotton were in demand. Once the
war was over and American cotton returned to the world market, the demand for Iranian
cotton ended. Farmers turned to growing poppies to replace cotton. See generally F. Wi-
soN, PERsIALr wt AND CusTo _s 272 (1895). Second, a British enterprise, the Indo-Euro-
pean Telegraph Company, while building a telegraph line in Iran, allegedly encouraged Iran-
ian workers to use opium. J. Johns, History of Drug Abuse in Iran, 31-32, June 1, 1972
(unpublished thesis in University of Utah Library).
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C. 1900-1920
Although the 19th century saw the opium trade flourish, there was growing
opposition to it, mostly on humanitarian grounds.138  Many Englishmen in par-
ticular were shocked by their country's involvement. 139 Gladstone, for instance,
said of the Opium Wars and the opium trade:
A war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated to cover this country with
permanent disgrace, I do not know and have not read of. The British flag is
hoisted to protect an infamous traffic; and if it was never hoisted except as it is now
hoisted on the coast of China, we should recoil from its sight with horror.140
The United States began to have strong reservations about opium at the close of
the Spanish-American War in 1898 when it acquired jurisdiction over many areas
in the Pacific where opium was smoked.' 4 ' Viewing the widespread addiction in
the Philippine Islands, Congress banned opium use throughout that territory
in 1905.142 In 1906 China itself began to take measures to control opium abuse
within its borders.' 43 Once begun, the movement towards governmental control
over opium consumption became contagious. In 1907, after first agreeing to re-
duce its exports of opium to China, India began to introduce measures to reduce
its own domestic consumption of opium.' 44 Finally, at the instigation of the
United States, an International Opium Commission met in Shanghai in 1909 to
discuss the international control of opium generally and the situation in China
specifically.145 Iran was one of the 13 nations represented at the meeting and
voted in favor of each of the nine resolutions adopted by the Commission.
146
The Shanghai Conference represented a moderate aboutface for the Iranian
government-at least in terms of its international posture on the question of the
opium trade. Throughout the 19th century Iran had maintained a permissive
attitude towards opium consumption at home and actively encouraged the export
trade.' 47  Now, by agreeing in principle with the resolutions of the Opium
Commission, Iran committed itself to attempt to suppress opium smoking at home
and to adopt reasonable export measures to prevent the shipping of opium to
those countries prohibiting its entry.' 48
The Iranian government did make good on the first of its commitments in 1910.
In that year, a law was enacted which provided that, after seven years, all non-
138. Blum, A History of Opium, supra note 2, at 52-53. There was, of course, a history
of resistance to opium on the part of the Chinese government. An edict against opium was
promulgated by the emperor as early as 1729. Id. at 52.
139. Id.
140. J. WILLoUGHBY, OPIum AS AN INTERNATioNAL PROBLEM: THE GENEvA CoNIFRpNcEs
9-10 (1925).
141. Blum, A History of Opium, supra note 2, at 50n.2.
142. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1408, § 6, 33 Stat. 944.
143. 1. WiLLOUGHBY, supra note 140, at 14.
144. Id. at 15.
145. Wright, The International Opium Commission, 3 AM. J. INT. L. 648 (1909).
146. Id.
147. See notes 128-31 supra and accompanying text.
148. For a text of the resolutions of the Shanghai Conference see 3 Am. J. Irr. L. 275-
76 (Supp. 1909).
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medical use of opium and all use of shireh would be forbidden. 149 In the mean-
time, the government monopolized the processing of, and increased taxes on, stick
opium, and required that all burnt opium residue used to make shireh be sold
back to the government. 150 Ai. this time, however, Iran did not move on its second
commitment-to curtail the export of opium to China and to other countries.
The reason for Iran's reluctance to reduce opium exports is not hard to fathom-
the opium trade produced substantial tax revenues for the Iranian treasury. 5"
In defense of its position, Iran argued that no Persian opium was exported di-
rectly to China but rather to Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements where it was
then reexported to China.'52 In effect Iran refused responsibility for controlling
exports which, although ultimately bound for China, were not directly exported
to China.
On December 1, 1911, the first International Opium Conference met at the
Hague to incorporate into an international convention the resolutions agreed upon
in Shanghai two years before.Yt3 Again Iran was represented at the conference. 15
The agreement that was ultimately proposed for ratification was an attempt to
suppress opium, morphine and cocaine abuse gradually throughout the world,
with most of the crucial language found in the first three chapters. Chapter
I covered raw opium, obligating each contracting power to enact "effective laws
or regulations for the control of [its] production and distribution."' 5 The Chap-
ter also committed the contracting nations to take measures to prevent the export
of raw opium to countries which prohibited its entry' 5 -a commitment that
was particularly objectionable to Iran.157 Chapter II regulated prepared opium
and shireh. Specifically, the chapter obligated each contracting power to take
measures aimed at the gradual suppression of the domestic manufacture of, and
traffic in, prepared opium and shireh-something which Iran had already under-
taken in the Opium Law of .910.158 The convention also required nations to
prohibit the import and export of prepared opium, although not immediately. 59
The provisions of Chapter lII committed signatory nations to enact pharmacy
laws to limit the manufacture, sale, and use of morphine, cocaine, heroin, and
medicinal opium to medical and legitimate uses only.' 60
149. J. MACCALLum, TwBNTY YEARS OF PERsur Op~rm (1908-1928) 7 (1928).
150. Id.
151. Wright, supra note 145, at 665.
152. MAcCALLUM, supra note 149, at 6.
153. The Hague Conference was rather brief in duration. It began on December 1, 1911,
and ended January 23, 1912. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 140, at 25.
154. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1929 (1915); T.S. No. 612,
8 L.N.T.S. 189.
155. Id. art. 1.
156. Id. art. 3.
157. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 140, at 36.
158. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, art. 6, 38 Stat. 1929 (1915), T.S. No.
612, 8 L.N.T.S. 189; notes 149-50 supra and accompanying text.
159. International Opium Convention, Jan,- 23, 1912, art. 7, 38 Stat. 1929 (1915), T.S. No.
612, 8 L.NT.S. 189.
160. Id. arts. 9-14.
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The Iranian representative at the Conference, Mirza Mahamoud Khan, did
not support the convention unreservedly. He specifically objected to that part of
Chapter I which committed contracting nations to prohibit exports of raw opium
to countries forbidding their entry.161 Since China had banned Persian opium
imports as of January 1, 1912, to subscribe to the provision would have meant
that Iran must put an immediate end to the profitable China trade.1 2  During
the conference, Mirza Khan offered a compromise-his government would sup-
port Chapter I in its entirety if it were reworded to allow for the suppression of
opium exports to these countries "as soon as possible" rather than "imme-
diately."'' 63 The compromise, however, was rejected by the other nations.
Although he did eventually sign the 1912 convention, 6 4 Mirza Khan's signature
was not tantamount to ratification by the Iranian Parliament. The convention
specifically provided for separate ratification by each of the contracting govern-
ments. 165 By 1914, the Iranian Parliament still had not adopted the agreement. 166
Iran's chief objection to curtailing opium exports continued to be its desire to
retain the substantial revenues it derived from the opium export trade.167  This
loss of revenue, however, was not the sole reason for its opposition to the conven-
tion. An immediate ban on opium exports would have had a disastrous effect
on the Iranian farmer since it would have left the government little time to adopt
a long-range program of crop substitution. 6 8  By holding out for a gradual re-
duction of opium exports, Iran was attempting to cushion the economic hardships
that would otherwise face the Iranian farmer. 69
The advent of World War I, however, dealt a crippling blow to those who had
hoped to suppress the international opium trade.' 70 There could be little talk of
implementing the Hague Convention when Europe and the Middle East were
battlefields. For the Iranian poppy farmer, however, the war was a fortuitous
event. With the country occupied at various times by Turkish, Russian, German,
and English troops,' 7 1 the Iranian government was forced to curtail its attempt to
eradicate opium use.' 72
D. 1920-1929
With the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran in 1921, the government em-
161. Specifically, Iran objected to article 3(a) of Chapter I. In addition, Iran took the
position that, since it had no treaty with China, it was not concerned with Articles 15 to
19 which concerned China. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 140, at 36, 256.
162. MAcCALLuM, supra note 145, at 9.
163. Id.
164. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, art. 25, 38 Stat. 1929 (1915), T.S.
No. 612, 8 LN.T.S. 189.
165. Id. art. 23.
166. Wright, The Opium Conference, 19 Am. J. INT. L. 559, 563 (1925).
167. Id.
168. Field study.
169. Id.
170. See MACCALLUM, supra note 149, at 11.
171. ARASTEH & AiRAsTrH, supra note 109, at 102. An estimated 300,000 Persians died
in the war. Id.
172. See authorities cited notes 149-50 supra; Azarakhsh, Nature, supra note 5, at 2.
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barked upon a new attempt to control domestic opium consumption. The gov-
ernment in Teheran was now dominated by Reza Khan, an obscure military Col-
onel brought to power by a successful coup in February of 1921.173 In the suc-
ceeding decades as head of government and ultimately as Shah, Reza Khan was
to make a concentrated effort to modernize Iran.174  The problems facing the
new ruler were staggering. Contemporary reports suggest that opium abuse,
which was by no means the most pressing national concern, was running out of
control. For instance, out of 60,000 inhabitants of Kerman, 25,000 were thought
to be addicts.Y' 5 In Isfahan, long a center of opium use,17 6 roughly one quarter
of the population depended for their livelihood on some facet of the opium
trade.17 7 Perhaps the most revealing figure was an estimate that the population
of Iran consumed 38 times more opium than was required for legitimate medical
use.
1 78
In the fall of 1922, an American Financial Mission arrived in Teheran to over-
see the general financial administration of the country, including the collection
of all opium taxes. 179 In order to assure that these taxes were paid, it was obvi-
ously essential to centralize the production of all commercial opium in government
warehouses where banderoles or government tax labels could be placed on the
opium to be sold. As one member of the mission stated:
It was clear to us that the extension of opium centralization, difficult as it might
be, was imperatively necessart in order to increase the revenues and to establish
a measure of government control over an industry which public sentiment con-
demned and which must eventually be restricted.18 0
Although attempts to enforce the tax laws and to require latex to be processed
in government warehouses were ultimately successful, they did lead to some riot-
ing and killing in Isfahan.' s '
Although the main thrust of the government's new policy was obviously to fa-
cilitate the collection of revenue, certain measures were taken during this period
to reduce the demand for drugs. For example, opium smoking was banned in the
army and in the government service.' 8 2 At this time, however, the government
did not make efforts to limit the total acreage committed to poppy cultivation.
Iran still had not ratified the Hague Convention nor had it withdrawn its stated
opposition to any controls over opium exports. Iran's refusal to agree to any ex-
173. WiLBER, supra note 5, at 97.
174. For a brief description of the modernization program of the Shah see id. at 145-
53.
175. NELiOAN, supra note 28, at 27.
176. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
177. In his book The American Task in Persia, A.C. Millspaugh reports that out of 80,000
inhabitants of Isfahan, 5,000 directly worked in the opium trade. If each of these 5,000 had
three dependents, Millspaugh argues:, at least one-fourth of the population would be depend-
ent upon the opium trade. A. MmLSPAUGH, THE AmERiCAN TASK IPERSIA 189-90 (1925).
178. NELIGAN, supra note 28, at 29.
179. mILLsPAUGu, supra note 177, at 19-21, 61-69, 189-90.
180. Id. at 189.
181. Id. at 189-92.
182. IACCALLUM, supra xote 145, at 4Q,
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port controls made it an ideal transshipment point for foreign opium exporters
who were subject to strict export prohibitions in their own countries, and as a
consequence, Iranian "imports" of opium increased dramatically. In 1920-21,
for example, 286 pounds of opium had been imported; in 1923-24, the figure
had increased to 22,074 pounds.' 83 Acutely embarrassed by such tactics, Iran
in 1924 banned opium imports and the transshipment of any foreign opium from
its ports' 84
The Second Opium Conference was convened in Geneva in 1925 under League
of Nations auspices.' 8 5 At the conference Iran came under intense pressure to
ratify the Hague Convention and withdraw its objections to export controls. In
order to ease the economic shock that would be caused by accepting export con-
trols, Iran made certain requests: (a) that it be given a substantial twenty year
loan, (b) that foreign nations declare a moratorium on collecting debts of the
Iranian government, and (c) that it be given a free hand to increase all import
duties regardless of treaty.' 86 In order to assess these demands as well as the
total drug situation in the country, the League of Nations sent a commission of ex-
perts to Iran in 1926. S7 The commission reported that, although reduced opium
production would cause short range difficulties, ultimately Iran's economy would
benefit. As for Iran's enumerated requests, the commission recommended that
Iran should be given latitude to adjust its customs duties, but did not mention the
loan or the moratorium on the repayment of government obligations.' 88  In their
place, the commission suggested that Iran be given a three year grace period be-
fore beginning its reduction program.'8 9 During these years, Iran should begin
to improve its internal economy preparatory to the chauge-over. The commission
also suggested that fran could increase its opium revenues during this period by
establishing a licensing program for those who cultivated opium.190
The government of Iran was understandably angered by the report, but it
seemed willing to follow some of its main outlines-at least on an experimental
basis. Thus, in 1929 the government adopted the Opium Monopoly Law.' 91 As
was suggested by the League Commission, the law required licensing of opium
growers and retailers, with the licenses to be issued by the newly created Opium
Monopoly Department.' 92
Although the 1929 opium policies were doubtlessly a by-product of League pres-
sure, there was another factor influencing the new approach. Reza Khan, now
Shah, was intent on returning Iran to its former greatness.' 93  To achieve that
183. Id. at 23.
184. Id.
185. 6 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 607 (1925).
186. WLLoUGHBY, supra note 140, at 363.
187. LEAGUE OF NATioNS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. 33, at 148 (1925).
188. MAcCALLum, supra note 149, at 30.
189. Id. at 47.
190. Id. at 46.
191. E. Chehrazi, The Success of the Government of Iran in Narcotics Control 1 (April
14, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Chehrazi].
192. Id.
193. WILBER, supra note 5, at 97-98.
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end, he began a program of rapid industrialization and Westernization. 194 As
one commentator observed:
An age-old social order was sacrificed to the new progressive regime. Nobles lost
power and prestige, and the use of titles was abolished. The merchants lost free-
dom of enterprise as they were drawn into the governmental system of monopolies
and of controls over industry, commerce, and trade .... The [Moslem] clergy
lost direct control of much of its vast trust funds; religious law gave way to civil
and criminal codes. .... 19.
In such a society, the use of opium had to be rigidly controlled lest it begin to effect
levels of productivity.
E. 1929-1955
With the creation of the Opium Monopoly in 1929, Iran entered a new phase
of drug control. Theoretically the monopoly could have been used both to reduce
domestic opium consumption by limiting production and to raise revenue for Shah
Reza's industrialization program. Although the two purposes were not necessarily
inconsistent, the history of this period shows revenue production gradually emerg-
ig as the dominant purpose of the Opium Monopoly.' 96
Initially, the government's efforts to reduce poppy cultivation showed signs of
success. Helped in large part by an educational campaign launched by a power-
ful prohibitionist organization, the Society Against Opium and Alcohol, the total
amount of land devoted to poppy cultivation was reduced from 25,000 to 10,000
hectares by 1938.107 Indeed, in certain provinces, such as Rasht, Qum, Teheran,
and Azarbaijan, poppy cultivation was totally banned.198 But, just as in 1914, ex-
ternal events intervened and nullified much of the work already done.
At the outbreak of World War II Iran remained neutral, but the possibility of
a German occupation of Iran was a matter of concern to England and Russia.' 99
This factor, coupled with Iran's strategic importance on Russia's southern flank,
led to the occupation of the country in August of 1941 by British and Russian
soldiers.200 The Shah abdicated, and the occupying powers replaced him with
his son, the present Shah. 20' The military occupation apparently totally disrupted
the program of drug control. The Iranian government did try to institute new
drug control measures during the war. In 1942, for example, the Opium Mo-
nopoly attempted to register all addicts in order to issue them a permit entitling
them to purchase specified quantities of opium. The program, however, was
largely unsuccessful.202
194. id. During this period, Reza Khan even monopolized folk industries, such as carpet
weaving. See 7 INA TRmBUNE, Aug. 1972, at 56.
195. WInBER, supra note 5, at 98..99.
196. See Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 4.
197. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 1.
198. Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 3. See also Saleb, Iran Suppresses Opium Production,
8 BULL. NARc. July-Sept., 1956, at 1 (Iran). Even with this decreased cultivation, huge
amounts of Iranian opium were supplied to the Japanese for use in their occupation of China.
See ANSLINGER & Tom, iNs, THE TR-FFIc iN NARcOncs 9 (1953).
199. See, WILBER, supra note 5, al. 101-02.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 102.
202. Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 2.
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At the close of the war, opium use was perceived as a monumental problem.203
Possibly one-tenth of the population was addicted, 204 due at least in part to the
government Opium Monopoly itself.20 5 More concerned with showing a profit
than with controlling the spread of addiction, the monopoly has been charac-
terized by some of its harsher critics as "pushing" drugs.2 06 This critical post-war
situation led to renewed efforts by the Society Against Opium and Alcohol to con-
vince the government to ban all opium cultivation and to prohibit all opium use
as the only feasible solutions to the problem.20 7 The Society was a formidable
lobbyist. Organized in over 60 towns, it sponsored a massive education campaign
through publications, conferences, and theatrical events.2 0 8  In its propaganda,
the Society marshalled convincing arguments and statistics to support its cause.209
These arguments were shaped along the following lines.
1. The Problem to be Solved
Estimates of the number of addicts were staggering. The Society itself set the
number of addicts at 1.5 million in 1945;210 by 1955 some claimed that the
number had climbed as high as 2.8 million.211 The daily opium consumption
in 1945 of these addicts was thought to be two tons. 212 Opium dens existed openly
throughout the country. In Teheran alone there were over 1,200 such dens. 218
2. Minimal Economic Loss to the Country
The Society conceded that the government earned 600 million rials ($18,-
433,800) a year from the domestic sale of opium. 21 4 But, it argued, addiction
cost the country much more. First of all, there was a daily loss of one-half mil-
lion work hours traceable to addiction.215 Second, the personal sufferings result-
ing from opium addiction were incalculable. For example, 5,000 suicides a year
were attributed to opium addiction.21 6 As for the 300,000 farmers involved in
opium production, the Society pointed out that the average farmer grew opium
on only part of his land. Thus, by banning opium cultivation, the government
would not cut off all of his income.21 7 In addition, the Society pointed out, crop
203. Id. at 4.
204. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 2.
205. Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 4.
206. Field study.
207. Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 3-5.
208. Id. at 3.
209. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 2.
210. Id.
211. See authorities cited note 5 supra.
212. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 2.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 3.
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substitution did work. Linseed and wheat had already been successfully sub-
stituted for opium in several areas of the country.2 18
3. Exisience of a Large Black Market
The Society estimated that two billion rials (approximately $61,500,000) a year
were earned as profits from the flourishing illicit market in opium-more than
three times as much as the government earned in revenue from the Opium Mo-
nopoly.219 In effect, the government's permissive opium policy was resulting in
more profits for the lawbreakers than for the government itself. The only way
to correct the situation was to prohibit all cultivation of the poppy, thereby cutting
off the illicit traffickers' sourco of supply, as well as indirectly working to reduce
consumer demand for opium.
4. Exported Opium
By international agreement, Iran was permitted to supply 25 percent of the
world's licit opium requirements. 220 During the period from 1929 to 1955, the
production of opium in Iran ranged between 700 and 1,200 tons per year-a
portion of which was earmarked for sale in the world opium market.221 Between
1937 and 1952 the "average annual amount of opium exported was 119 tons, at
an average price per kilo of less than 800 Rials [approximately $25].11222 The
Society argued, however, that at a price of less than 800 rials per kilo, the gov-
ernment actually lost money on exported opium because the cost to the govern-
ment to purchase, process, and store the opium was in fact 1,200 rials per kilo.223
5. International Commitments
The Society contended that, while the thrust of Iran's international commit-
ments was aimed at reducing opium production and consumption, the Opium Mo-
nopoly was actually fostering addiction. 224 Exploiting this theme, the Society be-
gan to enlist international support for its campaign to ban poppy cultivation. In
1946, for example, the Society wrote President Truman requesting him to support
such a ban throughout the world.226 The President in his reply expressed support
for the program and wished the Society success in its domestic efforts to curb
poppy cultivation. 220
Whether or not influenced by the activities of the Society, the government of
Iran slowly began to stiffen its attitude toward drug abuse at the end of the
218. Id.
219. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 2-3.
220. Saba, supra note 118, at 2.
221. Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 3.
222. Id. at 5.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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1940's. 22 7  In 1947, for example, regulations were enacted prohibiting the im-
port, export, manufacture, purchase, sale, or possession of any "narcotic drug"
(defined, however, to exclude opium) except under narrow conditions.2 28 The
net effect of the law was that "narcotic drugs" could now be distributed only pur-
suant to a doctor's prescription. Exempted from the law, however, were patent
medicines, containing minimal amounts of restricted narcotic drugs.229
New opium laws, however, did appear two years later. In 1949 the Council
of Ministers directed the Ministry of Finance to purchase the 1949 opium harvest,
but not to resell it in the country-in effect ending government opium sales to ad-
dicts.230 Further, the Ministry was ordered to take the necessary steps to reduce
opium consumption throughout the country and to restrict future cultivation of
the opium poppy to the quantities needed for medical use and export.231 At the
same time the Penal Code was amended to outlaw opium dens and to provide
prison sentences for those who used opium or other narcotic drugs in a public
place. 232 But, as had happened twice before, events intervened to postpone an
effective government war on drug addiction. This time it was not external inva-
sion that caused the disruption; it was an internal struggle for power between
royalist elements loyal to the Shah and nationalist elements loyal to the then Prime
Minister, Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq.233 Not until August of 1953 did the Shah
emerge victorious in the political struggle,2 34 and not until 1954 did the govern-
ment, almost on the verge of bankruptcy from an international oil boycott, re-
solve its economic problems by negotiating an advantageous agreement with the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The agreement brought Iran approximately 150,000,-
000 pounds over the first three years. 235 With the return of political stability and
with an assured income from oil revenues (which could compensate in part for
lost opium revenues), the stage was finally set for a government ban on poppy
cultivation.236
F. 1955-1969
It was in 1955 that the Shah and the Parliament finally moved to impose a ban
on poppy cultivation and to outlaw the possession and sale of opium. The scope
of the ban probably surpassed even the fondest expectations of its proponents.
The ban was absolute, forbidding even the cultivation of the poppy for medical
or export needs.
227. The Council of Ministers even went so far as to decree a poppy cultivation ban in
1946, but it was not ratified by Parliament. Saleh, supra note 198, at 1.
228. Law of April 29, 1947, Regulations Concerning the Restriction, Manufacture, Ad-
ministration and Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1951/12 (1951).
229. Id. art. 16.
230. Law of March 19, 1949, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1951/10 (1951).
231. Id.
232. Law of July 20, 1949, U.N. Doc. B/NL.1951/11 (1951).
233. For a description of this struggle see WmBER, supra note 5, at 112-25.
234. Id. at 125.
235. Id. at 126.
236. United States financial aid during this period was also substantial. One report esti-
mates it at $2 billion. ARAsurm & AnAs'rn, supra note 109, at 119.
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1. The Legislative Program
The 1955 legislation was drafted and shepherded through Parliament by the
then Minister of Health, Doctor Jehan Shah Seleh.237 By its terms, the law banned
outright all cultivation of the opium poppy, the preparation and importation of
opium or any narcotic drug, and the frequenting of public opium dens.238 As for
addicts, the law permitted a six months grace period to allow them a reasonable
time to abandon their habits. 229 Once the period expired, the use, purchase, and
sale of narcotics was absolutely prohibited.2 40 The law, however, did try to cush-
ion the farmer's economic losses. The government promised to provide long
term credits and technical assistance in order to help the farmer substitute new
crops to replace opium. 241  With the basic law on the books, the government
quickly promulgated regulations to supplement its provisions.
a. Prohibitions Imposed on Poppy Cultivation and the Preparation
and Import of Narcotic Drugs
By government regulation, 212 different penalties were provided for different
categories of offenders. The offenders were divided into the illicit importers, the
landowners who illegally cultivated the poppy, and the farmers who assisted in
that illegal cultivation. 243 The most severe penalties were reserved for the drug
importer or processor. If convicted, he could be sentenced on the first offense
to a prison term of from two to five years in solitary confinement and a stiff
fine, depending on the weight of the drugs imported or processed. 244 For the third
offense he could receive life imprisonment. 245  Penalties for the landowner who
illegally cultivated the poppy vere somewhat less severe, amounting to a fine and
imprisonment for between six months and a year.246 For repeated offenses, how-
ever, the prison term was increased. 247 Less severe sentences were meted out to
the farmer who was caught assisting in any illegal poppy cultivation.248
b. Prohibition Imposed on the Frequenting of Opium Dens
Those who frequented public places such as cafes and hotels for the use of
narcotics were liable to from six months to one year in prison and a cash fine. Sub-
sequent offenses increased the severity of the prison term.24 9
237. Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 5.
238. Law of October 7, 1955, U.. Doc. E/NL.1956/1 (1956).
239. Id. art. 2.
240. Id. art. 3.
241. Id. art. 2.
242. Law of October 7, 1955, Regulations, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1956/40 (1956).
243. Id. §§ I(1)-(4).
244. Id. §1(4).
245. Id.
246. Id. § I(1).
247. Id.
248. ld. § 1(2).
249. Id. §H.
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c. Penalties for Use and Possession of Narcotic Drugs
After the termination of the six month grace period, any person who was found
using narcotic drugs without a medical prescription was liable to imprisonment
from one to two months; repeated offenses merited progressively longer prison
terms. 250 For those caught selling narcotics, the law mandated first offense pen-
alties of from three to six months in jail and a fine calculated according to the
amount and nature of the drug sold. As with those caught illegally using drugs,
repeated offenses resulted in more severe prison terms, culminating in a sentence
of from two to five years in solitary confinement for a fourth offense.251
d. Rehabilitation of Addicts
The Ministry of Health was required to prepare medicines and make them
available to those addicts wishing to effect a cure. All medical facilities were or-
dered to detoxify addicts and the Ministry was further mandated to send com-
petent medical officials to those parts of the country where there were no medical
facilities. 25 2
e. Crop Substitution Assistance
In those provinces where poppy cultivation had previously been authorized, the
government established commissions to supervise the changeover from poppy cul-
tivation to the cultivation of alternative crops. Financial aid to farmers took
the form of five to ten year interest free loans. Technical aid-particularly irri-
gation assistance-was made available 253 since the switch from opium, which re-
quired only moderate amounts of water, to alternate crops would undoubtedly
necessitate discovering new supplies of water.254
f. Fines Collected
Any revenue derived from enforcing the 1955 opium laws and regulations was
to be funneled back into the drug control system. One fourth was to be set aside
to support a reward program for law enforcement personnel; the rest was ear-
marked for rehabilitation and crop substitution projects. 255
Four years later, in 1959, the Iranian government gave further evidence of its
determination to make the poppy ban work by increasing penalties for every cat-
egory of drug offense.256 For example, the penalty imposed on convicted nar-
cotics smugglers or processors was increased to a prison term of from 5 to 15 years
250. Id. § V.
251. Id.
252. Id. § mI.
253. Id. § IV.
254. Water is in short supply in Iran. Mean annual precipitation is about 25 to 30
centimeters, one third of the world mean of 86 centimeters. See Khuzetan, The Granary
of Iran, 6 IRAN TImuNE, May, 1971, at 41.
255. Law of October 7, 1955, Regulations, § VI(12) U.N. Doc. E/NL.1956/40 (1956).
256. Law of June 22, 1959, Act to Amend the Law on Poppy Plantation and the Use of
Opium, U.N. Doe. E/NL.1960/1 (1960).
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at hard labor and a fine of 500 rials for each gram of opium and 3,000 rials for
each gram of other narcotics processed or smuggled into the country. 25 7  For a
second offense, the penalty provided was "death beside the fine."'258  For con-
victed narcotics peddlers, the penalty was set at 3 to 15 years at hard labor and a
stiff fine.259 A second trafficking offense warranted a sentence of life imprison-
ment with hard labor. 260  Landowners who illegally cultivated the poppy also
faced stiffer penalties. In addition to a fine of up to 100,000 rials for every
hectare or less of illegally planted opium, the illegal cultivator could be sen-
tenced to 3 to 15 years at hard labor.2 61 Repeated offenders were imprisoned
for life.2 6 2 If a village headman or district governor knew of the illegal cultiva-
tion but kept silent, he too would be punished.263
The new penalties extended to illegal drug use as well. The law now required
that anyone who used or injected another with a narcotic drug without medical
authorization be condemned to correctional imprisonment ranging from six months
to three years.26 4 If he was adjudged an addict, however, the offender was placed
in a compulsory treatment program instead of a prison, with the period of treat-
ment being considered as part of the criminal sentence. 265 The 1959 statute even
outlawed the possession of poppy seeds, which were then widely used on bread.
Anyone who kept such seeds was liable for correctional imprisonment ranging
from two months to three years. 2
66
The 1959 law also created a new category of drug offender-the person who
profited from or was an accessory to certain types of drug trafficking. For ex-
ample, article eight of the new statute provided that if "the person in whose pos-
session narcotics are detected is not the owner, but is merely a carrier for some
other person, the former shall be regarded as the accessory and the latter as the
principal. '26 7 To expose those who were profiting from the drug traffic, there
were proposals to permit investigations of individuals living in border areas who
displayed any unusual wealth. 61
2. Success of the Program
An examination of the laws of 1955 and 1959 reveals that the government's
program was directed at achieving two objectives-the reduction of the avail-
ability of drugs and a decrease in the demand for drugs. The former objective
257. Id. art. 4.
258. Id.
259. Id. art. 5.
260. Id.
261. Id. art. 13.
262. Id.
263. Id. art. 16.
264. Id. art. 9.
265. Id.
266. Id. art. 14.
267. Id. art. 8.
268. Wright, Progress in Iran: The Struggle Against the Evil of Narcotics Up to 1960,
12 BuLL. NARc., July-Sept., 1960, at 1, 4.
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was to be accomplished by banning all opium production and by imposing criminal
penalties to discourage drug smuggling. A decrease in the demand for drugs was
to come about through a massive addict rehabilitation program. The next few
paragraphs will present an analysis of each of these objectives.
a. Reduction in the Availability of Drugs
i. Ban on Poppy Cultivation
Most observers with whom the authors discussed the question agreed that the
ban on opium cultivation was quite successful. 269 Few bans, of course, are 100
percent effective. By its own figures, the government admitted that it destroyed
57 hectares of poppy cultivation in 1956, 300 hectares in 1957 and 1,445 hectares
as late as 1962.270 Although much of this growth was doubtlessly wild and not
purposely cultivated, its presence indicates that at least some illicit growing activi-
ties were still being carried on.
ii. Closing of Opium Dens
The government moved forcefully and expeditiously to close all opium dens.
After the 1955 law was enacted, the police made concerted midnight raids on
many of these establishments to shut them down.27' Although dramatic, these
raids were still quite successful, so much so that Minister of Health Saleh became
the target of notes written in blood threatening his life.272
iii. Preventing Smuggling
If the government's policies in banning opium cultivation and in closing opium
dens can be characterized as successful, its policy-objective of containing drug
smuggling ended in failure. Although seizures of illegal opium decreased dra-
matically between 1955 and 1957, they began to increase again in 1958 and soon
were running three times higher than comparable seizures before 1955.273 The
reason for this increased black market activity can be traced in large part to the
failure of Turkey and Afghanistan to cooperate with Iran in stopping smuggling.
Both Turkey and Afghanistan produce opium27 4 As will be described later
in this Article, the borders between Iran and each of these two countries are difficult
269. An anecdote related to the authors during the field study will illustrate both the suc-
cess of the ban and the way in which the rugged, barren geography of the country aided
in that success. Before the ban the British ambassador while flying over the country alleg-
edly remarked that the countryside was "white with snow." The "snow," of course, was the
white poppy fields, highly visible from the air because of the nature of the countryside. Af-
ter the 1955 ban, the ambassador was heard to remark on a second flight that the "snow"
had melted.
270. Saba, supra note 118, at table IV.
271. Field study.
272. Kamm, supra note 7, at 44; Field study.
273. Saba, supra note 118, at table IV.
274. Womm OPiu SuRvEY Al, A7.
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to patrol because of the terrain.27 5 Once Iran stopped growing its own opium,
Turkish and Afghan smugglers began bringing large quantities of drugs into the
country.2 0 As a result drugs were still available to the Iranian addict-only now
at a higher price.277 Even the substantial escalation of penalties in 1959278 did
not have its intended effect, as seizures of illegal opium continued to mount.279
If anything, the new penalties may have been counterproductive and directly
linked to the appearance of heroin in Iran in 1959. In the face of higher penalties,
some smugglers, it would appear, turned to importing morphine base in place of
bulky raw opium in order to reduce the risks of apprehension. With morphine
base readily available in the country, it was a short but predictable step to the
production of Iranian heroin.2 0
b. Decreased Demand
Perhaps the government's efforts in this area were doomed to failure from the
start. Although there were an estimated 1.5 million addicts in the country, the
1955 law provided a scant six-month grace period during which time addicts
could come to Ministry of Health centers for detoxification. Assuming that only
one-fifth of them came, that. would have meant processing 50,000 addicts a
month-a rather substantial undertaking-particularly when one realizes that the
government had few detoxification facilities available in 1955. 281 Even if an
addict were successfully detoxified, he was soon returned to his village where
there were no after-care or supportive facilities to help him stay away from his
habit. In 1955, 29,158 addicts were "treated" in this fashion; in 1956, 53,737; in
1957, 41,515; and in 1958, 28,085.282 Thus, in four years the government had
provided minimal treatment to only one-tenth of the estimated number of ad-
dicts in the country.
Some things may be said, however, in defense of the government's rehabilitation
efforts. Detoxification in a treatment facility was obviously not required for each
of Iran's estimated 1.5 million addicts. Some had become addicted circumstan-
tially and could abandon their habits on their own without too much discomfort.
Others, the government felt, could be successfully detoxified on an out-patient
basis with the help of medicine. To that end, the Ministry of Health widely
distributed medical supplies in order to help alleviate the symptoms of with-
drawal.283
Viewing the 1955 initiative in terms of its objectives, one must conclude that it
was only partially successful. It was true that the ban on opium cultivation had
275. See notes 398414 infra and accompanying text.
276. WoRLD Oprmrm Survwy Al I-A15.
277. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 5-6.
278. See notes 252-73 supra and accompanying text.
279. Saba, supra note 118, at table IV.
280. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 114, at 6.
281. Field study.
282. Saba, supra note 118, at table IV.
283. Saleh, supra note 198, at 2.
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worked and the number of addicts had been reduced. But there still remained
a resistant population of addicts who could not be induced or forced to abandon
their habits. To supply these addicts a large international black market had been
created. Growing frustration finally convinced the government and the Shah that
new measures were needed. In 1969, to the consternation of outside observers, 284
and in an apparent reversal of position, the Iranian government reinstated limited
poppy cultivation. 2 8
What prompted this change, however, was not so much a reversal of position
as a re-evaluation of current politices in the light of developing evidence. The
1955 strategy had conceived of the opium problem as a self-contained medical-
social problem. The opium consumed in Iran was mainly grown in Iran and dis-
tributed by Iranians; addiction was viewed as an endemic disease not much differ-
ent from malaria. It was believed that the solution to the drug problem was
similar to the solution to other medical problems.2 6  First, eradicate the
cause of the disease, in this case the supply of opium in Iran, and, second, cure
those who had the sickness, i.e. the addicts. The strategy might have worked if
Iran had been an island.
Iran, however, did not exist in isolation, and programs directed at what super-
ficially appeared to be a purely domestic concern carried international conse-
quences. As Iran successfully curtailed poppy cultivation and suppressed all le-
gitimate trafficking in opium, a situation was created which was ripe for exploita-
tion by foreign drug merchants willing to take the risks. Into this vacuum stepped
Turkish and Afghan smugglers. 28 7 Indeed, the more successful the efforts of the
Iranian government, the more lucrative the Iranian market became for these smug-
glers. Thus, what had begun as a domestically contained social problem rapidly
escalated into an international, political, and economic problem. First, the very
fact that these smugglers could cross over into Iran at will was a political embar-
rassment to the Shah. Particularly on the eastern border, bands of Afghan smug-
glers would sometimes penetrate as far as 100 miles into Iran before making their
connection. 288  Often on their return, they would loot an Iranian border village. 289
If nothing else, these forays demonstrated that the Shah could not control his own
borders. Second, the smugglers began to have a definite impact on Iran's balance
of payments in that large amounts of gold were leaving the country to pay for
smuggled drugs. 290  Exactly how much money was leaving the country is of
284. The announcement of Iran's decision to rescind the poppy law was characterized as
"a sharp disappointment to the International Narcotics Control Board." 22 BuLL. NARc.,
July-Sept., 1970, at 40. See also Kamm, supra note 7, at 44.
285. Law of March 4, 1969, Law Permitting Limited Cultivation of Poppy and Export of
Opium, U.N. Doe. E/NL.1970/17 (1970).
286. Z. Davidian, Narcotics Control in Iran-A Review with Regional Proposals 12 (April
14, 1966).
287. See notes 273-80 supra and accompanying text.
288. Kamm, supra note 7, at 45.
289. Id.
290. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 7. In the 19th century, the import
of opium into China resulted in a mammoth outflow of Chinese silver, causing domestic
economic problems. HEss, supra note 59, at 15.
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course a matter of debate. Although the government officials with whom the au-
thors spoke differed on the size of the drain, all conceded that it was substantial.
Third, although Iranian jails were soon crowded with drug offenders of all sorts, 2 91
the very success of these law enforcement efforts was causing serious economic
problems at two levels. At the administrative level, there were the rising costs
of apprehending and incarcerating these addicts. At the family level, there
were the economic and human hardships which resulted when a father or brother
(often the sole means of a family's support) was imprisoned.292
It was in the light of these factors that the government re-evaluated and modi-
fied its drug strategy in 1969. By this time the government had realized that a
domestic policy of total prohibition was not possible without regional cooperation.
Without such cooperation, the national efforts at repression only forced the traffic
underground and created an international black market, resulting in serious eco-
nomic problems for the country.
G. 1969-1973
The new drug control strategy of 1969 was designed to correct the weaknesses
of the 1955 prohibition effort. It is apparent from the structure of the law that
the number one priority was to crack down on the smugglers. In order to accom-
plish this task, Iran embarked upon various diplomatic initiatives to encourage
Turkey and Afghanistan to cooperate.293 Coupled with these diplomatic efforts,
the Shah introduced new mechanized capabilities along the borders to intercept
the smugglers 29 4 and imposed the death penalty upon capture and conviction. 295
The second priority was to reduce the flight of capital from Iran. To achieve
this objective, the government abandoned its prohibition on all opium production
and consumption. Limited poppy cultivation would be permitted under gov-
ernment licensing, and the opium would then be distributed to registered addicts
through a government maintenance program.2 96 Presumably in this way the de-
mand for smuggled opium woudd be reduced, and with it the flight of capital to
pay for this smuggled opium.
In order to usher in the new policy, the government granted a limited amnesty,
freeing most of the petty drug offenders who had been arrested and sentenced
under the 1955 law.297 In the future the government would concentrate on ar-
resting the drug trafficker, not the drug addict or user. Instead of imprisoning
him, the addict would be directed into rehabilitation programs which would be
made available by the government. The elements of this complex drug control
system merit detailed analysis.
291. See id. at 10.
292. Field study.
293. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 15.
294. See note 414 infra and accompanying text.
295. Law of June 21, 1969, ff e(l), U.N. Doc. E/NL1970/24 (1970).
296. Law of March 4, 1969, Law Permitting Limited Cultivation of Poppy and Export of
Opium, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1970/17 (1970).
297. Law of June 21, 1969, (a), U.N. Doc. E/NL.1970/24 (1970).
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1. Poppy Cultivation
a. Licensing and Acreage Allocation
By the Law of March 4, 1969,298 the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural
Co-operatives was authorized to embark upon poppy cultivation in such regions
and in such quantities as were approved each year by the Council of Ministers. 290
The Ministry is required to propose to the Council an annual list of the names
of the regions and the area of land needed for the cultivation.300 Once the land
was approved for cultivation by the Council, the Ministry would in its turn license
the individual farmer, the rural co-operative, or the joint stock farming company
to grow the poppy.801 The company or farmer, as a condition of receiving the
license, had to agree in advance to sell his entire harvest to the government at a
price and place to be fixed by the Ministry. 302  In 1970 the government allo-
cated the permissible crop area among thirteen provinces and governates-with
the largest poppy acreage allocated to Khorasan province in the northeast of the
country.3 0 3
The amount of land allocated to poppy growth is supposedly tied to the re-
quirements of the new opium maintenance program for registered addicts.30 4
Since the government overestimated the number of addcits who would be regis-
tered in the first years of the program, too much land was initially allocated to
poppy cultivation. For example, in 1972, after the new program had been in
effect for two years, opium was grown on approximately 23,000 hectares, which
resulted in an opium yield of about 217 tons.30 5 During this same year the main-
tenance program had registered approximately 110,000 addicts who required only
100 tons of opium to maintain their habits.306 As a result of this miscalculation,
the government had far more opium than was required to meet the needs of its
registered addict population. To correct the mistake, the government drastically
reduced the land allocated to poppy cultivation in 1973-to possibly as little as
2,000 hectares.3 07
b. Price Differential
The reinstitution of poppy cultivation was designed to provide domestic opium
298. Law of March 4, 1969, Law Permitting Limited Cultivation of Poppy and Export of
Opium, U.N. Doe. E/NL.1970/17 (1970).
299. Id. art. 1.
300. Law of March 4, 1969, Law Permitting Limited Cultivation of Poppy and Export of
Opium, Amended Executive Code under Article 1, art. 1, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1970/18 (1970).
301. Id. art. 2.
302. Id.
303. WORLD OPiuM SuRvEy A13.
304. Field study.
305. See WoRLD Oprium SURVEY A14. The figure of 23,000 hectares was mentioned to
the authors during their field study. The government also funnels some illegal opium which
it has seized into the maintenance program. See Annual Report, supra note 86, at 12.
306. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 13.
307. Id. at 14.
1974]
IOWA LAW REVIEW
for Iranian addicts.308 The most greatly feared danger, however, was that this le-
gal opium would find its way into the illegal market.30 9 To prevent this diversion,
the government devised a pricing policy that would encourage the sale of all do-
mestic opium to the government. 310 The Iranian government pays approximately
$120 for a kilogram of raw opium.3 11 This price must be higher than comparable
black market prices. 312 The theory is that by creating a price differential between
the licit government price and the black market price, opium farmers will sell
their entire crop to the government. A kilogram of Afghan opium, however,
wholesales in Teheran for between $120 to $186, depending on its quality.313
Thus, if black market prices in Teheran should increase substantially, it is con-
ceivable in the future that illegal traffickers could afford to equal or exceed the
government price at the field and still hope to make a profit. Presumably if that
happened, the government would have to increase its purchase price.
Paying a premium price for the opium crop, however, results in an obvious eco-
nomic loss for the government. With the 1972 world price for licit opium run-
ning at almost $24 per kilogram, 314 the Iranian government was paying $120 for
a kilogram-more than five times the world price. One immediately realizes the
significance of miscalculating the amount of opium needed to support the regis-
tered addict population. As has already been mentioned, the Iranian government
did overestimate its initial opium needs-a mistake which resulted in an expensive
surplus and forced the government to cut back opium production in 1973.315 Al-
though it has been expensive, the government's program has reportedly been suc-
cessful in keeping the domestic opium crop out of the hands of black mar-
keteers. 316 Whether the price differential has been the prime ingredient of that
success, however, cannot be determined, because it has been combined. with a
highly effective system of harvest and production controls. 31 7
c. Harvest Controls
The Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Co-operatives is primarily responsible
308. WORLD Opiur SuRvEY A13.
309. Id. at A12.
310. Id. at A14.
311. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 12. Licensed growers are paid $100
per kilo of opium with a 30 to 36 percent water content. By the time the water content
is reduced to 5 or 6 percent, which is the standard for smoking opium, the cost has risen
to $120 per kilogram. 24 BuLL. NARc., Jan.-March, 1972, at 26.
312. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 12. For a critical discussion of Iran's
pre-emptive buying policy, see Holahan, The Economics of Heroin in DEALING wiTH DRUG
ABusE: A REPORT TO Tm FORD FOUNDATION 263-64 (1972). The price paid by the Iranian
government is far in excess of even the black market price of opium in other countries. In
Afghanistan, for example, the black market price for a kilogram of opium is between $25 to
$35; in Laos it is $50 a kilogram. See N.Y. Times, May 26, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
313. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 18.
314. WORLD OPium SuRvEy 9 Table 3.
315. See notes 304-07 supra and accompanying text.
316. WoRLD Opium SuRvEY A1I4
317. Id. at A13-14.
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for controlling poppy cultivation. 318 The procedure followed by the Ministry
was described in detail to the authors and appears to be a carefully regulated and
coordinated set of controls. When acreage is approved for cultivation, it is roped
off. As the crop appears, anything growing outside the ropes is uprooted and
destroyed. Shortly before harvesting, the farmer or rural co-operative on whose
land the opium is being grown must notify a representative of the Ministry or the
Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie of the impending harvest. In order to prevent pos-
sible diversion, the gendarmes may often billet themselves near the opium fields
and oversee the collection of the latex. As the bowls of gum are collected, they
are delivered directly either to the representative of the Ministry or to the gen-
darmes. It is reported that these controls have minimized diversion of opium
latex from the field into the illicit market.8 19 Of course, farmers may secrete a
small amount of opium latex in the fields for local village consumption. Because
of the severity of the penalties, however, even this practice would presumably be
the exception rather than the rule. If any illegal conduct is uncovered, the
poppy fields are to be destroyed.320  "The government has detected and destroyed
about 1 hectare of illicitly cultivated opium poppy annually in recent years."3 2
1
Once the latex has left the field, there are rigid controls enforced at each stage
of the production process. The gum is first "weighed, tagged, and stored in a
locked and supervised container, which is transported under guard to government
warehouses. '322 The weight of the product is repeatedly checked to prevent any
diversion.323  Although controls are rigid, this period when the latex is being
processed into prepared opium may in fact be the time of maximum leakage.
Statistics are obviously not available, but it has been suggested that perhaps as
much as five percent of the crop may disappear between harvest and sale to regis-
tered addicts.324
d. Alternative Crops
While opium is admittedly a labor intensive crop, it is still one of the most
lucrative crops that can be grown by the Iranian farmer, yielding higher returns
per hectare than most available substitutes such as wheat, barley, sunflower, al-
falfa and sugar beets.32 5 During the 1955-69 opium ban, however, the Iranian
farmer had to find acceptable alternative crops to replace the poppy. Wheat and
linseed were among the prime crop substitutes.3 26  With the return of limited
poppy cultivation, it might be anticipated that farmers would be eager to grow
318. Id. at A13.
319. Id. at A14.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Field study.
325. See authorities cited note 22 supra.
326. Field study. See also Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 3. The government is also en-
couraging the growth of mulberries instead of poppies as Iran hopes to expand her silk indus-
try. 6 IRAN TmnuNn, August, 1971, at 25.
19741
opium and anxious to receive a share of the land allocated to the crop, but the au-
thors were informed that such has not been the case. Various factors may account
for the anomaly. First, the size of the opium crop will vary from year to year
-an allocation of X hectares this year could be reduced to Y hectares next year,
introducing a degree of uncertainty into future crop planning. Second, the tight
controls over poppy cultivatio:a and harvesting necessitate frequent visits by gov-
ernment and gendarme agents.-something which may be highly distasteful to the
Iranian farmer.327
e. Reinstitution of a Poppy Ban
Significantly, in the very text of the 1969 legislation Iran promised to discon-
tinue poppy cultivation as soon as neighboring countries adopted a similar pol-
icy. 28 In 1971, under pressure from the United States, the Turkish Government
decreed that there would be a total ban on poppy cultivation after the 1971-72
growing season.3 29  Since there are still large stores of opium in Turkey-stores
which could supply the illegal market for several years to come330-the Iranian
government has adopted a cautious "wait and see" attitude regarding the Turkish
ban.331 If the Turkish ban is effective, it will doubtlessly elicit some response
from ran.3 32 Indeed, the 1973 reduction in opium acreage, although primarily
motivated by economic considerations, may have been indirectly influenced by
Turkish policy3 33
Illegal poppy cultivation continues in Afghanistan and Pakistan, however. In
both countries, the cultivation takes place in tribal areas outside the effecitve con-
trol of the respective central governments.33 4 Because of economic and political
conditions, it is highly unrealistic to expect either country to be able to enforce
a workable ban on poppy cultivation in the foreseeable future.33 5 Thus, it will
undoubtedly be a long time before Iran will be expected to honor its commitment
to reinstitute a ban on poppy cultivation.
2. Maintenance Program
Like the reintroduction of poppy cultivation, the opium maintenance program
is aimed at eliminating drug smuggling across ran's borders.336 The theory is
327. See WLBER, supra note 5, at 173.
328. Law of March 4, 1969, Law Permitting Limited Cultivation of Poppy and Export of
Opium, art. 1, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1970/17 (1970).
329. Ad Hoe Committee Report, supra note 80, at 16. For the impact of the ban on Tur-
key see N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1972, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
330. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1972, at 14, col. 1.
331. See Ad Hoe Committee Report, supra note 80, at 13. Recently, however, there have
been some indications of strong opposition to the ban in Turkey.
332. Id.
333. See id. at 15.
334. See id. at 5, 8-9. There is some evidence that United States aid money may be sup-
porting Afghan opium cultivation. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
335. See WORLD Opia Survny AP, A20.
336. Field study.
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that if Iran can supply its own addicts with drugs, there will be less demand for
smuggled drugs. 37 Under the 1969 law an addict may register in the government
maintenance program if he is over 60 years of age or if he is too il to undergo
detoxification. 338 If he qualifies for the program and is so certified, the addict
will receive a card bearing his photograph along with the details of his allowable
dosage, the place where he must purchase his drugs, and the period of validity
of the card, which can be up to six months. 339 Tn 1972 the government claimed
that approximately 110,000 addicts were registered in the program.340 At the
time of their research in the beginning of 1973, the authors were informed that
approximately 60 percent of the registered addicts were admitted to the program
because they were in the 60 years of age or over category, and that the remainder
were those considered too ill to undergo withdrawal.
a. Procedures of Admission into the Program
An addict who wishes to be admitted into the maintenance program must first
obtain a private physician's certificate that he is in fact an addict and either too
old or too sick to undergo withdrawal. 341 With the certificate, the addict then
proceeds to the Ministry of Health342 where the fact of his addiction is confirmed
by urinanalysis. The certificate of the private physician and the results of the
urinanalysis are then sent to a committee of three doctors who make the final
determination of the applicant's eligibility for the program. If he is accepted
into the program, the doctors first determine his daily dosage level, which will
usually be between two to five grams of opium. Once the dosage is set, the doctors
will then issue the addict a card containing his picture, his name, his maximum
permissible dosage, and the distribution center (always a local pharmacy) where he
may obtain his drugs.343 No other distribution center may legally supply the
addict with his drugs.344 Figures were unavailable on the number of distribution
centers authorized to service the registered addicts, but informal estimates set the
number of approved centers in Teheran at ten.
The addict admitted to the government program does not receive his opium
without cost. The price paid depends on a variety of factors, the most important
being the quality of the opium purchased. For example, the government sells
two grades of opium to registered addicts: Class A opium is Iranian grown opium
which retails for 17.5 rials per gram; Class B opium is contraband Afghan opium
337. Id.
338. Law of March 4, 1969, Law on Limited Poppy Cultivation and Export of Opium,
Executive Code under Article 3, art. 4, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1970/19 (1970).
339. Id. art. 4(b).
340. Ad Hoe Committee Report at 13.
341. Law of March 4, 1969, Law on Limited Poppy Cultivation and Export of Opium,
Executive Code under Article 3, art. 4, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1970/19 (1970). The details of the
admittance procedure were explained to the authors during their field research.
342. Id. art. 4(b).
343. Id.
344. See id.
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which has been seized by the government. Although it sells for only six rials per
gram, its lower morphine content makes it less preferred by addicts.
In order to ensure that the retail price of its opium remains competitive with
smuggled opium, the government adjusts the price according to the area of the
country where it is sold. Thus Class A government opium is sold to addicts in
Teheran at 17.5 rials per gram; however, in the provinces along the eastern fron-
tier where Afghan opium is plentiful, the price is lowered to remain competitive
with the price of black market opium in that area.
On the whole the government appears to have been quite successful in keeping
the price of opium within the means of the registered addict. This consideration
is an important one, for when the cost of drugs becomes more than the addict
can afford, the risk of his turning to crime to raise the additional money needed
to support his habit increases substantially. Although the statutory minimum
wage in Iran is 80 to 100 rials per day,3 45 the average daily wage for a skilled or
semi-skilled worker in manufacturing in Teheran was approximately 220 rials in
1971,341 and that figures may have increased for 1973. Therefore, even if the
worker purchased three grams of Class A opium per day, it would cost him less
than one quarter of his daily wage to maintain his habit.
b. Criticisms of the Program
Although the government's maintenance program has been in existence for only
a short time, a number of serious criticisms were expressed to the authors during
their research.
Perhaps the most serious charge made against the maintenance program is that
it may actually increase rather than decrease levels of addiction in the country.
Critics argue that drug addiction is an epidemiological disease which spreads in
a traceable pattern from various individuals. Legalization of even limited drug use
by registered addicts increases the chances of these ."legal" addicts spreading their
habits.
National attitudes toward drug abuse, critics argue, will also be affected by a
program of legalized drug use. Legalization of limited opium use for some indi-
viduals will give renewed respectability to opium use by all people. Some con-
firmation of this point may b8 found in the increasingly fashionable practice at
Teheran parties of circulating the opium pipe among the male guests. 347 Others
argue that, if not rigidly controlled, opium use could become intertwined with
Persian nationalism. Iranians have historically felt that they possess literature, cul-
ture, customs, and religion that set them apart from their Arab neighbors.348
It is feared that opium use, with its ancient traditions and its emphasis on self-
indulgence, could become an expression of these feelings.
345. EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY MISSION TO IRAN, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION,
REPORT 87 (1972).
346. Id.
347. See Kamm, supra note 7, at 44.
348. See WLBER, supra note 5, at 163-64.
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It is quite possible that there is some diversion of drugs from the maintenance
program into the illegal market. There is some evidence of leakage in that non-
registered addicts have admitted receiving drugs dispensed through the government
program. 349  It is not difficult to imagine how such leakage might occur. For
example, an addict who is over 60 years of age will be admitted to the govern-
ment program as a matter of course.350 Once he is receiving his daily supply of
opium, he can reduce his own consumption and sell part of his ration. For its
part, the government seems willing to accept a certain amount of illegal diver-
sion from the maintenance program. It is preferable from a policy standpoint
to have the non-registered addict use diverted government opium rather than iMle-
gal opium smuggled across the Iranian borders. When an addict buys smuggled
opium he lends support to the illegal traffic which the Iranian government is out
to destroy. What is more, most of the purchase price leaves the country; when
he buys home grown opium, the purchase money circulates within the country.
The presence of legal opium makes the control of illegal opium more difficult
as it is difficult for the police to distinguish between the two. Since a registered
addict can legally have in his possession as much as a six day's supply of opium,351
it is often difficult for the police to prove that the opium is not his but someone
else's. For example, if the police were to raid a party and find opium, a regis-
tered addict might be able to claim all of it as his own. Although government
opium is labeled for identification, smugglers can attach government banderoles
to contraband opium so that it can pass for legal opium.352
Problems have developed in the actual functioning of the maintenance program.
Critics argue that by allowing an addict to have only one source of supply, the
government effectively limits his mobility. More serious, no doubt, is the sugges-
tion that the maintenance program may never be as successful in rural areas as
in urban areas. In order to be effective in rural areas, authorized distribution
centers must be placed near enough to addicts so that they do not have to travel
long distances to obtain their dosage. Although statistics on the number and lo-
cation of designated pharmacies were unobtainable, it is highly unlikely that the
government can supply drugs to addicts in many of the villages scattered over
the countryside. 35 3 In this context, it should be recalled that as late as 1964, only
one quarter of Iran's population had access to medical facilities of any kind what-
soever.
3 54
3. Rehabilitation
Except for medical reasons, which include, of course, admission to the govern-
ment opium maintenance program, the use of all narcotic drugs remains absolutely
349. Field study.
350. Law of March 4, 1969, Law Permitting Limited Cultivation of Poppy and Export of
Opium, Executive Code under Article 3, art. 4, U.N. Doec. E/NL. 1970/19 (1970).
351. Id. art. 2.
352. Field study.
353. See generally WMBER, supra note 5, at 173.
354. Johns, supra note 137, at 8.
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forbidden under the 1969 legislation.85 5 As under the 1955 law,356 the govern-
ment is once again committed to provide adequate money and facilities for the
treatment of addicts. 357 Unfortunately, just as in 1955, it appears that effective
rehabilitation in Iran is mainly illusory.3 58 There are some recent indications,
however, that the government is trying to rectify the situation.
a. Numbers of Non.-Registered Addicts Requiring Treatment
By the government's own figures there are between 200,000 and 300,000 ad-
dicts in Iran.3 5 9 With 110,000 addicts in the drug maintenance program,360 that
leaves perhaps 200,000 addicts who still must obtain their drugs illegally. In or-
der to reduce the number of unregistered addicts, the government was presented
with several alternatives:
(1) It could lower the eligibility requirements for participation in the govern-
ment maintenance program, permitting many of these addicts to register for a
legal opium supply. (2) It could reinstitute strict law enforcement measures to
jail large numbers of these addicts. (3) It could attempt to pressure addicts into
rehabilitation programs in an effort to reduce demand for illegal drugs.
Alternative (1) was obviously not acceptable because the standards were not in
fact lowered. Perhaps it was thought that lowering standards would be too expen-
sive, or socially undesirable. Alternative (2) had already been tried and failed dur-
ing the 1955-69 period. In theory then, alternative (3) was the only acceptable
solution to the problem. In order to make it work, however, the government
would have to provide addicts not only with sufficient incentives to abandon their
habits but also with adequate facilities to assist them in the process, e.g., detoxifica-
tion and rehabilitative facilities.
b. Civil Penalties as Incentives to End Addiction
Just as a strictly enforced ciminal law was to be used to discourage black
marketeering,30' a system of civA' penalties such as loss of a job or expulsion from
school was supposed to encourage addicts to abandon their habits. For ex-
ample, under the 1969 statute a student who is diagnosed as an addict is forbid-
den to continue his studies and the matter is reported to his parents.362 If the
student abandons his habit withtin four months, he can return to school-other-
355. Law of March 4, 1969, Law Permitting Limited Cultivation of Poppy and Export of
Opium, art. 3, U.N. Doc. E/NL. 1970/17 (1970).
356. Law of November 18, 1955, art. 3, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1956/1 (1956).
357. Law of March 4, 1969, Law Permitting Limited Cultivation of Poppy and Export of
Opium, art. 8, U.N. Doc. E/NL. 1970/17 (1970).
358. Field study.
359. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 12.
360. Id.
361. See notes 391-444 infra and accompanying text.
362. Law of March 4, 1969, Law Permitting Limited Cultivation of Poppy and Export of
Opium, Executive Code under Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7, art. 11, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1970/20
(1970).
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wise he must stay out of school until he can prove that he is no longer addicted.363
Should the student become addicted a second time, he is suspended for one year
and can continue studying only if he gives up his habit during the period of sus-
pension.364 Readdiction for a third time bars him from further education.365
Similar penalties apply to laborers who come under the Labor Law and who are
diagnosed as addicts.3 6  Unless they give up their addiction wifiin four months,
they are considered to have annulled their work contracts and must be dis-
charged.367 If the laborer gives up his habit within one year after discharge, he
must be rehired.3 66
The use of civil penalties as negative incentives to end addiction is intriguing
and may be suggestive of new approaches to the problem of drug abuse in other
countries. No matter how effectively these civil penalties can pressure an addict
to abandon his habit, however, ultimate success will be achieved only if the ad-
dict can in fact be weaned from his habit. For that process, adequate treatment
facilities are critical.
c. Facilities for Treatment
Most observers closest to the Iranian drug problem would agree that adequate
drug treatment facilities unfortunately do not exist in the country.30 Of the
approximately 12,000 addicts treated in Iran in 1971, the Vanak Clinic in Teheran
accounted for 3,466.370 The clinic has approximately 150 beds, accommodating
between 3,000 and 4,000 patients a year.371 The addict remains in the hospital
for up to three weeks, during which time he is withdrawn from his drug.372 The
usual method of detoxification is with methadone followed by tranquilizers or
amphetamines, depending on the patient.3 73 Once totally detoxified the indi-
vidual is sent back to his family, hopefully not to return to his habit. The hos-
pital's own statistics on recidivism, however, indicate that this hope is not often
realized. During one particular month in 1972, 193 out of 372 patients in the
hospital were repeaters.3 74
Outside of Teheran it is difficult to assess the number of beds actually avail-
363. Id.
364. Id. art. 12.
365. Id.
366. Id. art. 6.
367. Id.
368. Id. art. 8.
369. See Annual Report, supra note 86, at 7; Davidian, supra note 286, at 10. The
former source gives the number of addicts treated in 1971 as 12,193, but points out that the
figure "is no indication of the relative demand for treatment; it is rather a measure of the
treatment facilities available." Id.
370. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 7-8.
371. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 7-8; Saba, supra note 118, at 2. The report by
Dr. Saba, which is the source for the number of beds at the Clinic, is seven years old.
372. Saba, supra note 118, at 2.
373. Id.; Field study.
374. Field study. The month in question was the Moslem month of Mehr which ran
from September 23 to October 23, 1972.
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able to drug addicts who wish to undergo detoxification. Some cities have what
are called "barracks"-separate buildings reserved for addicts within larger hos-
pital compounds.37 5  Although the government claims that there are 14 such bar-
racks in existence, one can never be sure on any particular day that they are all
in operation.3 76 Even assuming that all 14 were continuously operational, that
would only add about 200 more beds37 7 for addict withdrawal to the 150 already
available at the Vanak Clinic. There has also been a center opened in Zahedan
for the treatment of addicts.3711 However, throughout the entire country with an
addict population of approximately 400,000,379 our estimate is that there are
probably less than 400 beds exclusively set aside for addict withdrawal. It is true
that there are private hospitals available to addicts, but such private treatment
would be too expensive for the average Iranian worker.380
Not only is the number of treatment facilities abysmally small, but the quality
of the treatment received is often inadequate. There is, for instance, little after-
care treatment available once an addict leaves the hospital, due in large measure
to the lack of trained social workers in the country. Even at the best equipped
drug facility in the country, the Vanak Clinic, there were only four social workers
on the staff in January, 1963.381 When one realizes that between 3,000 and
4,000 addicts undergo treatment at the clinic every year, it is hard to imagine
how this staff of four could provide adequate after-care support for more than a
small percentage of those who need it.
Recognizing the need for more facilities and for more advanced treatment meth-
ods, the government envisions constructing six addict rehabilitation centers
throughout the country-at Yaftabad (a suburb of Teheran), Rezaieh, Mashad,
Kermanshah, Kerman, and the sixth in the province of Baluchistan.3 82 A patient
would remain in one of these centers for approximately six months, during which
time he would undergo withdrawal, receive job training if necessary, and undergo
psychological and social therapy.88 3 Once released, his progress would be closely
monitored for one year by trained after-care teams.38 4
Although the first of these centers was completed more than two years ago,
it still remains empty because there is no trained staff available to open the cen-
ter. s Meanwhile, the government is continuing to build the other centers, seem-
ingly oblivious to the fact that it cannot provide the necessary trained personnel
to staff them.38 0 The United Nations has shown increased interest in the project,
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 7.
379. See authority cited note 5 supra. This figure includes registered addicts.
380. Field study.
381. Saba, supra note 118, at 2.
382. Field study; Annual Report, supra note 86, at 7.
383. Field study.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
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however, and has stationed one of its rehabilitation experts in Teheran in order to
assist the government in making the centers operational.38 7
4. Increased Law Enforcement Efforts
If the maintenance and rehabilitation programs were aimed at reducing the de-
mand for smuggled drugs, increased law enforcement efforts were aimed at re-
ducing the supply of these drugs. The main supply of illegal drugs, of course,
came from Turkish and Afghan smugglers who were operating along Iran's bor-
ders.388 Consequently, it was not surprising that the main law enforcement ef-
forts were levelled at these black marketeers. The objective was to escalate the
risks of smuggling to such a point that most individuals would be deterred from
undertaking any black market activities. Even those illegal drugs which did enter
the country would cost more, making them less able to compete with the do-
mestic opium sold by the government. To achieve this objective, the govern-
ment decided upon a dual strategy. First of all, the probabilities of detection
and arrest had to be increased. This increase would be accomplished by the
modernization and strengthening of existing law enforcement capabilities.389 The
second part of the strategy centered on increasing the penalties imposed on the
smuggler once he was arrested. To achieve the maximum in terrorem effect, the
government introduced the death penalty for all those caught illegally trafficking
in drugs.390
a. Modernized Capabilities: At the Borders
The Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining law and order
along the borders of the country. 391 In that capacity, it is in command of efforts
to intercept Turkish and Afghan smugglers. The Iranian Customs Administra-
tion, of course, has a certain limited jurisdiction in this area, but it has control
only over certain designated border checkpoints. 392 Since there is only one such
checkpoint on the Irano-Afghan border (at Islam-Qaleh on the Herat-Mashad
road),3 93 Customs plays a relatively minor role in the total effort to intercept
border smuggling.
During the past years, the Iranian anti-smuggling effort has been totally over-
hauled. Specifically, the gendarmes and customs officers have been provided
with increased professional training and more sophisticated mechanized capabil-
ities.
i. Increased Training
In order to fulfill its responsibility for the prevention of smuggling, the Gen-
387. Id.
388. WoRLD OpiuM Suxvy A14-A15.
389. See notes 391-414 infra and accompanying text.
390. Law of June 21, 1969, 1 e(1), U.N. Doe. E/NL.1970/24 (1970).
391. Ad Hoe Committee Report, supra note 80, at 14.
392. Id. at 15. Customs mans 100 posts throughout the country. Id.
393. Id. at 10.
1974]
IOWA LAW REVIEW
darmerie operates patrols in all the border regions, complemented by frequent
roadblocks, searches, and ambushes. 394 In the past few years, the Gendarmes
have been given specialized supplemental training in anti-smuggling techniques
from both American and United Nations experts. The United States has assigned
to the Gendarmes a specialist in anti-smuggling tacticsms5 and the United Nations
has stationed both a general narcotics adviser and a drug rehabilitation expert in
Teheran.3 90 Increased training has likewise been provided to Iranian customs
officials. For example, the United Nations Division of Narcotic Drugs recently
sponsored a specialized narcotics training program for 40 customs officers.39 7
ii. Mechanized Equipment
Perhaps the Gendarme's most critical need has been for highly mobile equip-
ment which can be used to detect and intercept smugglers. A brief explanation
of the situation on the Turkish and Afghan borders will explain why mobile
equipment is so important.
Almost 300 miles long,398 the Turkish border is highly mountainous, making ef-
fective aerial or ground reconnaissance difficult. Even if smugglers could be
spotted, it would be difficult to intercept them because there are so few roads
running along the border. Compounding an already impossible situation are the
many Kurdish tribesmen who live along the frontier.399 These nomadic herders
provide an ideal cover for smuggling drugs as they move back and forth across the
border with their flocks. The government has to handle the Kurds with care
since historically there have been tensions between the intensely independent
Kurds on the one hand and the Iranians on the other.400 To police this
300 mile border, Iran has approximately 40 fixed posts, each garrisoned by
8 to 24 gendarmes, the number depending on the post's strategic location.401
The main drug smuggled over the Turkish border seems to be morphine
base, which will be converted later into a crude heroin in various villages and
towns in western Iran.402 Since morphine base is much less bulky than opium,
it can be carried over the border by individual smugglers-a pattern quite differ-
ent from that prevailing on the Afghan frontier.4 03 Thus, every man and woman
who crosses the Turkish border is a potential smuggler. As a result, the chances
394. Id. at 14.
395. Id. at 15.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. The description of conditions along the Irano-Turkish and Irano-Afghan borders is
based on discussions and materials provided in the field study.
399. See WmIER, supra note 5, at 165-69.
400. Id. at 168. There may be 2,000,000 Kurds in Iran, in addition to those in Iraq, Tur-
key and Russia. ARA=sTE & ARA:,TH, supra note 109, at 4. The Kurds and other tribal
groups in Iran, while conceivably involved in the smuggling of drugs, do not generally use
drugs themselves. Field study.
401. Field study.
402. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 13.
403. Kamm, supra note 7, at 45.
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of intercepting those actually carrying the morphine base are appreciably re-
duced.
The problems posed for the Iranian Gendarmerie on the Turkish border are
minor in comparison with those on the Afghan frontier. The Afghan border is
substantially longer than the Turkish frontier-500 miles as compared to 300
miles.404 If the terrain on the Turkish border can be described as rugged, the
terrain on the Afghan border would have to be described as forbidding. Com-
posed of mountains and deserts, the border is frequently impassable in winter due
to snow and in summer due to heat and dust. To police this vast stretch of land,
there are approximately 55 gendarme posts-each manned by less than a dozen
gendarmes. 405
The pattern of smuggling on the Afghan border is of a different sort than on
the Turkish border. The Afghans do not smuggle drugs individually but in large
bands.400 Moreover, these Afghan tribesmen are desperate and will take greater
risks than their Turkish counterparts. There are, of course, reasons for this reck-
lessness. Stories abound of Afghan chieftans who will hold a man's family hostage
in order to force him to smuggle drugs. 406 If the smuggling operation fails for
some reason, groups of smugglers have been known to attack Iranian villages to
bring ransom money back to the chieftains. 408 What is more, the typical Afghan
is much poorer than the typical Turk,40 9 and the money from drug smuggling at
least represents one sure method of putting food on the table.
When they cross the border, these bands of Afghan tribesmen number any-
where from 10 to 100 and carry as much as two tons of opium or hashish tied
to animals' backs.410 The smugglers carry military weapons and will fight to the
death if intercepted by the Gendarmes, with large gun battles being the rule and
not the exception.411 For example, Iran's 1971 annual report of drug seizures to
the United Nations contains this passage:
Gendarmerie patrols continued to meet with armed opposition from smugglers,
chiefly in Khorassan Province. In sixteen separate encounters with armed gangs,
eighteen smugglers are known to have been killed, two wounded and twenty-six ar-
rested. In addition, a total of 6,082 kilograms of opium was seized after these
clashes and horses, camels, arms and ammunition and a substantial amount of
Iranian and Afghan currency was captured. The Gendarmerie themselves suf-
fered casualties in both killed and wounded.4 12
As late as March, 1973, a seizure on the Afghan frontier netted 12.7 tons of
opium. It was the largest drug seizure in the history of Iran and one of the largest
ever made in the world.413
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 42.
408. See id. at 45.
409. Id.
410. Field study. A list of 1971 encounters between smugglers and Gendarmes, including
drug amounts seized, is contained in Annual Report, supra note 86, at 14-16.
411. Field study.
412. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 13-14.
413. 8 IRAN TRamuNE, March, 1973, at 5.
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In order to better contain drug smuggling along both borders, the Shah has re-
cently purchased 200 motorcycles, 5 Huey helicopters and 100 night vision de-
vices. 414 This new equipment will give the Gendarmerie increased mechanized
capabilities. For example, 00 of the motorcycles purchased are all-terrain-
cycles which can be used in any type of country, no matter how rugged. The
Huey helicopters are large and will permit the Gendarmes to insert a force of
combat soldiers into battles with smugglers. Similarly, they can be used as sup-
port gunships during these skirmishes. As for the nightscopes, they will increase
the Gendarmes' capabilities of detecting small bands or single individuals trying
to cross the border.
b. In the Cities
While the Gendarmes control the borders, the national police have responsi-
bility for law enforcement in cities with a population of over 5,000 people.415
The national police have been particularly effective in combatting drug traffick-
ing in Teheran. The police have a special narcotics section and use all of the
sophisticated anti-narcotics techniques employed by American police depart-
ments.418  To cite a few examples given to the authors during their research,
the police have developed a network of informants and regularly use undercover
agents to make "buys." In addition, the national police in Teheran are skilled
in the process of using street arrests to work up the drug distribution ladder to
the major traffickers. These methods appear to have been particularly success-
ful in driving heroin laboratories out of the city and into the countryside.
c. In the Countryside
In addition to patrolling the borders, the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie is also
responsible for law enforcement throughout the countryside of Iran and in towns
with a population of less than 5,000.417  In the area of rural drug law enforce-
ment, the Gendarmes seem to concentrate their efforts in the border provinces
such as Khorassan or Azerbaijan. Once drug shipments reach their "Iranian con-
nections," it is presumed that they are broken up into smaller amounts, making
them much harder to detect and intercept.
The Gendarmes face special difficulties in policing the towns and villages of
Iran. These hamlets are usually small and separated by great distances. 418 The
fact that the villagers live in what are essentially closed communities makes it dif-
ficult to introduce undercover agents into a village to report on drug trafficking.
If the Gendarmes decide to raid a village, they usually find the people uncoop-
erative and silent. These factors may account for the Gendarmes' rather limited
success in checking the heroin traffic. From all reports, large quantities of heroin
are manufactured in primitive laboratories in certain of these villages in north-
414. Field study.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. W-LBER, supra note 5, at 169.
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western Iran.419  In fact, to produce the amount of heroin needed to supply
Iran's 10,000 addicts, 420 one would assume that there must be a large number
of these "laboratories" currently in operation. In 1971, however, the Gendarmes
seized only two heroin laboratories. 421  Hopefully, the acquisition of helicopters
by the Gendarmes will ease the burden of village surveillance and make unex-
pected raids on villages more productive.
d. Increased Criminal Penalties
Because it held the not uncommon belief that criminal behavior is deterred
by severe penalties, the government of Iran imposed severe sanctions for drug
trafficking in both 1955 and 1959.422 However, smuggling continued. 423  In
1969, the government decided on a new escalation of penalties in the hope that it
might finally put an end to smuggling. Under the new law, any individual caught
illicitly importing, selling or offering for sale opium, morphine, heroin or cocaine
or illicitly holding, concealing or carrying more than two kilograms of opium or
more than ten grams of morphine, heroin or cocaine was to be sentenced to
death.42 4 Less severe penalties were imposed for possession of smaller amounts
of drugs. For instance, if the opium was less than two kilograms but more than
fifty grams or if the morphine, heroin or cocaine was less than ten grams but
more than one gram, the punishment was imprisonment at hard labor for from
three to fifteen years and a stiff monetary fine.425  In case the drugs possessed
were below these amounts, the law provided for a sentence of from one to three
years together with a fine.420
In order to maximize the law's deterrent effect, jurisdiction over all capital of-
fenses was transferred from civil to military tribunals.42 7  In these military courts,
proceedings are summary and usually conducted in secret.428- If convicted, the
smuggler faces the possibility of death by firing squad.429  Although not carried
out in public, word of these executions does appear regularly in the press. 480 By
the end of January, 1972, 133 drag traffickers had been executed. 431 Although
information is difficult to obtain, not all convicted drug traffickers are executed. 482
One might surmise that the government selects those to be executed in order to
419. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 12, 16; Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80,
at 13.
420. Azarakhsh, Nature, supra note 5, at 4.
421. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 13.
422. See notes 242-51, 256-68 supra and accompanying text.
423. See notes 273-80 supra and accompanying text.
424. Law of June 21, 1969, 11 e(1), U.N. Doc. E/NL.1970/24 (1970).
425. Id. I e(2).
426. Id.
427. Id. f.
428. Field study.
429. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 10.
430. See Teheran Journal, March 19, 1973, at 5, col. 2.
431. WORLD OPrum SuRVEY A15.
432. See Annual Report, supra note 86, at 17.
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obtain the maximum effect on a particular group of smugglers. Reports do indi-
cate, however, that a large number of those executed have been Afghans.433
Whether the highly publiciz-d death penalty has had its intended effect is dif-
ficult to judge. On the western border there seems to be evidence that the Turks
have stopped smuggling opium and turned instead to smuggling less bulky mor-
phine base.43 4 Similarly, the Turks have begun to adopt ingenious new smug-
gling devices to decrease the risks of being personally caught with drugs. 48 5 The
death penalty appears to have had less success on the Afghan border, however,
and, if anything, may have induced the Afghan smugglers to increase the size
of their bands and the fire power of their weaponry.
Although the death penalty has received maximum publicity, harsh penalties
still exist for the non-registered addict caught with small amounts of opium in his
possession.4 36 But it must be remembered that Iran's new drug policies were in
part a reaction to what had happened under the 1955 law. After the strict law
enforcement policies failed to accomplish their purpose of putting an end to the
black market, the government granted a limited amnesty to most drug offenders at
the time the 1969 law was promulgated.437 Obviously, the government has no
intention of repeating its past mistakes by arresting en masse thousands of ad-
dicts who are themselves the helpless victims of narcotics smuggling. Although
documentation is impossible, Iranian law enforcement agencies may have adopted
a rather relaxed attitude when it comes to apprehending and incarcerating the
non-registered opium addict. For example, in certain areas of south Teheran,
drugs can be purchased on the street with impunity.4 8 There are also reports
from the countryside that opium pipes can be freely purchased in many Iranian
villages. 439 Indeed, this "hands off" attitude toward the addict may explain the
government's seeming lack of concern over moderate opium diversion from the
maintenance program into the black market.440
Two final aspects of the new penalty structure warrant mention. First, the new
law does not increase penalties for those who profit from drug smuggling. 441
Since these individuals are often legitimate businessmen, the death penalty might
have a greater deterrent effect on them than on the poor Afghan tribesmen who
actually carry the drugs. Second, the death penalty was not provided for those
caught smuggling hashish.442 Whether intended or not, this omission had the ef-
433. WoRLD OPIum SuRvEy A15.
434. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 13.
435. Field study.
436. Law of June 21, 1969, f eCL), U.N. Doe. No. E/NL.1970/24 (1970).
437. Id. I a. See also The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 10; text accompany-
ing note 297 supra.
438. Field study.
439. Id.
440. See note 350 supra and accompanying text.
441. The death penalty is provided for those manufacturing, importing, selling or offer-
ing drugs for sale. Law of June 21, 1969, e, U.N. Doc. E/NL.1970/24 (1970). Unless
this language were read quite expansively, it does not seem to cover a person who finance
drug smuggling.
442. See id.
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fect of exempting certain European and American tourists from the possibility of
execution. Because Afghan hashish is particularly popular in Europe, Europeans
and Americans in transit through Iran are often arrested carrying smuggled hash-
ish.443 Presently, there are about 50 North Americans and Europeans in Iranian
jails on various drug charges. 444 It is likely that arrests of this nature will con-
tinue as long as hashish remains popular in Europe and the United States. The
presence of so many foreigners in its jails, however, constitutes something of a
political embarrassment to the Iranian government. It is clear that the government
would prefer not having them in its prisons, 445 but no alternative solution has as
yet been found short of permitting Americans and Europeans to violate the Iranian
law with impunity.
5. International Cooperation
The Shah has concluded that part of the solution to Iran's drug problem lies
in regional and international cooperation to end smuggling.448 Thus he is at-
tempting to foster international drug agreements among the nations in the region.
For example, in 1972 Turkey and Iran signed a protocol which provided that
Iran would build 20 new border posts on the Turkish frontier.447 Diplomatic ini-
tiatives with Afghanistan have been less successful. While the central govern-
ment in Kabul seems willing to assist in regional drug control efforts, there is little
that it can realistically do without massive economic assistance.448 The Afghan
police force, by way of illustration, is appallingly undertrained and underpaid.
Only 10 to 20 percent of the police are literate and their average monthly wage
is less than $2.00.449 As for banning opium cultivation in Afghanistan, it would
be impossible without massive economic aid to ease the transition from opium
cultivation to the cultivation of other crops. 450 Moreover, even if the aid were
forthcoming, the central government could not guarantee that the aid would not
be used to grow opium. 45 1 Tribal khans, in whose territory much of the
opium is grown, have political influence in Kabul.452  These problems, and the
dim prospects for viable solutions, make it appear that any efforts on the part
of the Iranian government to explore areas of cooperation with Afghanistan will
probably do little to put an end to the smuggling. As for Pakistan, the Shah is
said to have very close relations with its leaders. Although there is still some
drug smuggling over the Irano-Pakistan border, 4583 it is not a major problem and
443. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 13.
444. Field study; Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 15.
445. Field study.
446. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 15.
447. Id. at 14.
448. WORLD Opium Supvy A9-A10.
449. Field study. Others suggest the situation is much worse. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1972,
at 10, col. 4.
450. WoRLD OPIuM SutvBY A9.
451. See N.Y. Times, May 6, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
452. WORLD OPiuM SupvEy A9.
453. See id. at A14-A15.
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is considered adequately contained.454 There is practically no smuggling into
Iran from either Russia or Iraq. 455
The United Nations has been furthering Iran's efforts to stop drug smuggling.
For example, the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs decided that an ad hoc
Committee on Illicit Traffic in the Near East and Middle East "should be estab-
lished to study questions related to illicit traffic in the region in order to promote
more effective cooperation and mutual assistance in the suppression of illicit traf-
fic within, from and into the region." 456  Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Sweden
were appointed members of the Committee, and Afghanistan was invited to par-
ticipate in the Committee's wcrk.4511 In October, 1972, the Committee conducted
a study tour of the area, having consultations in four capitals-Islamabad, Ka-
bul, Teheran and Ankara.458 The Committee's recommendations called for in-
creased regional collaboration to stop drug smuggling.4 59 As for technical and
financial assistance, the Committee recommended that the "first priority . . .
should be given to the Government of Afghanistan to assist it to eliminate illegal
opium production and trafficking." 460
6. Drug Education and Research
For all practical purposes, drug education does not exist in Iran. On the con-
trary, Iranian government officials express concern that drug eaucation may be
counterproductive as a drug control strategy, contending that the mention of the
dangers of drug abuse may encourage experimentation. 461 Wholly apart from
the merits of the position, it is clearly a reversal of the government's earlier stance
with respect to drug education. Prior to the ban on opium consumption in 1955,
there had been a massive educational campaign to convince the Iranian people
of the dangers of opium,462 and much of the dramatic decrease in addiction which
followed the 1955 ban may be attributable to this effort.
It is doubly unfortunate that the Iranian government's position is so adamantly
opposed to drug education, because there is already in existence a mechanism by
which the information could be disseminated to the addicts living in the villages
454. Field study.
455. See WO.LD OPiuM SuIWEY A14.
456. Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 2.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 4.
460. Id. at 24.
461. For example, Dr. H.A. Azarakhsh, Director-General of the Ministry of Health and
Iran's representative in the United Nations' Commission on Narcotic Drugs, has stated that
much of the country's heroin addiction is found among the children of the wealthy, and that
modem methods of communication, such as films, radio, television, magazines and
books, have all helped to hasten this process. This media brings to those in Iran
news of what is happening in other countries, and much is being written and
spoken about drug abuse in the world today. Azarakhsh, Nature, supra note 5, at 3.
For a discussion of drug education in the United States see Wald & Abrams, Drug Education,
in DEALNG wrrH DRuo ABUSB 123 (1972).
462. Chehrazi, supra note 191, at 3.
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of Iran. As part of his much heralded "White Revolution," the Shah has estab-
lished a Literary Corps and a Health Corps to bring aid to rural Iran.463 With
proper training, these young volunteers could have a significant impact on the
level of rural addiction. As for the problem of urban addiction, the extent of
heroin addiction in Teheran 464 and other urban centers may yet convince the
government to experiment with a drug education program in the schools.
Drug research has fared no better at the hands of the government than drug
education. There has been no systematic and broadly based effort to study the
causes or effects of addiction in the country. Only at the Vanak Clinic in Teheran
can one find any scientific information on the typology of the Iranian addict. As
for statistical information on the levels of drug related crime in the country, it is
either non-existent or unavailable. There are signs, however, that the govern-
ment's past disinterest in drug research and analysis may be changing. For ex-
ample, doctors at the government-run Vanak Clinic are currently engaged in so-
phisticated and important research with detoxified heroin addicts to see whether
methadone or certain other drugs will keep them from returning to their habits.4 5
In addition, there are some important private research projects being con-
ducted in Iran. At the University of Teheran scientists are working to perfect a
species of poppy which could replace papaver somniferum. Called papaver brac-
teatum, the new species of poppy has unusually high thebaine levels and no mor-
phine content whatsoever.466 It is hoped that this poppy can be used to supply
the thebaine used in the production of codeine without providing the morphine
necessary for the production of heroin. 467 Conceding the possibility that papaver
bracteatum might some day replace papaver somniferum in areas of legal poppy
cultivation, it is perhaps naive to expect that the opium poppy will cease to be
grown clandestinely to supply heroin for the lucrative black market.
7. Opium Exports
a. The Legal Export of Opium
Although Iran once supplied more than 40 percent of the world's licit opium
needs, 468 it does not currently export any opium46 9 nor does it appear that it will
do so in the foreseeable future. Since the Iranian government officially pur-
chases opium latex at $120 per kilo, it would make little economic sense to grow
463. White Revolution and I, Teheran Journal, White Revolution Special, Jan.-Feb.,
1973, at 19-28.
464. Of those persons treated at the Vanak Clinic in Teheran, 47 percent of the patients
from Teheran were addicted to heroin, whereas only 25 percent of those from the provinces
were so addicted. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 10.
465. Field study.
466. For reference to the work being done on papaver bracteatum see Cumock, supra note
90, at 15; 7 IRAN TIuNE, July, 1972, at 3; Lalezari & Sharghi, Papaver bracteatum Lind.,
a Highly Rich Source of Thebaine, 213 NAvtn 1244 (1967).
467. Field study; see notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
468. WODLD OPvUM SuRvny All.
469. Annual Report, supra note 86, at 2.
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opium for sale on the world market where a kilo of opium presently sells for only
$24.470 A dramatic increase in international opium prices, however, might con-
vince Iran to reenter the wofid market, especially now that Turkey has decided
to abandon opium production..471 Until recently the largest share of the world
opium market belonged to India, with Turkey having the second largest share.47 2
If the price of opium were sufficiently attractive, Iran might decide to bid for Tur-
key's share of the world market.
b. The Illegal Export of Opium
There is no evidence that Iranian opium is finding its way into the international
black market.473 Tight control over harvesting the opium crop prevents any
significant "leakage" by the farmer, and any diversion of opium during the proc-
essing stage is presumably absorbed by the domestic black market.47 4
While Iranian opium may not appear in the international black market, the
same cannot be said of many Iranians. In fact, there is evidence of significant
involvement of Iranian nationals in this clandestine drug traffic. The most obvious
indicator is that Iranians must be involved in smuggling morphine base and chem-
icals into the country in order to produce the heroin used by Iranian addicts. In
addition, Iranians have also been arrested in Europe for smuggling drugs.475 Al-
though there may be no direct connection, it is interesting to consider three related
facts. First, according to most reports, West Germany has emerged as a major
drug "storage depot and staging area" for the international narcotics traffic.476
Second, Iranian emigres comprise an active segment of the German underworld.477
Third, Iran has become a major trans shipment point for Afghan hashish on its
way to Europe.478 It would seem that certain Iranians have developed an inter-
national organization capable of smuggling large quantities of hashish to Eu-
rope. With the ban on opium production in Turkey, this same organization could
presumably change to smuggling large quantities of Afghan opium to Europe
as a substitute for Turkish opium in the production of heroin. Because of the pos-
sible impact on the American heroin market, drug officials in Washington are
understandably concerned with the growth of this highly organized drug network
between Iran and Europe. 479
IV. DRUG CONTROL IN IRAN: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION
As has been mentioned in the introduction to this Article, the experience of
470. See notes 308-17 supra and accompanying text.
471. Ad Hoe Committee Report, supra note 80, at 15.
472. WORLD OPium SURVEY 8. table 2
473. Id. at A15.
474. Id. at A14.
475. Field study.
476. WoRLD Opim SURVEY 21
477. Field study. See N.Y. Timzs, May 20, 1973, at 20, col. 1, for reference to the large
Turldsh population in West Berlin.
478. See Annual Report, supra note 86, at 13.
479. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
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Iran in attempting to eradicate domestic drug consumption is instructive because,
perhaps more than any other country, Iran has experimented with the widest
variety of approaches. The country began with a policy of total permissiveness
which resulted in a national situation where opium consumption was widespread,
accepted, and ultimately sanctioned and supported by the government. In 1955,
in an abrupt reversal of policy, the Iranian government totally prohibited opium
cultivation and consumption, relying on law enforcement and rehabilitative ef-
forts to reduce the number of domestic addicts. Fourteen years later, in 1969,
the government shifted its drug policies yet again-this time permitting controlled
domestic cultivation and use of opium while increasing law enforcement efforts
aimed at suppressing the international drug traffic.
The most obvious moral that can be drawn from Iran's pre-1955 drug policies
is this: the ready availability of drugs leads to a massive addiction problem,
particularly in a society where there are few counter-pressures to impede the
spread of drug consumption. That there were few counter-pressures working
to impede drug consumption in fran is clear; if anything, the pressures were
working the other way. For example, far from discouraging opium production,
the government actively encouraged farmers to increase their poppy cultivation
for the tax revenue it brought. In addition, the lack of doctors and adequate
medical facilities resulted in the widespread and continuous use of opium as a
home remedy for various illnesses. Over the years, pressures such as these helped
to create a drug addiction problem in Iran of massive dimensions.
However compelling such an analysis may appear, it cannot serve as a com-
plete explanation for the high rate of addiction in Iran just prior to the 1955
prohibition laws. Although opium was fully as available in both Turkey and
Afghanistan as it was in Iran, neither of these countries reported a significant
opium consumption problem.4 0  Complex cultural differences may account in
part for the peculiar situation in ran,481 but the situation in Turkey and Afghan-
istan counsels caution before too readily accepting the proposition that the avail-
ability of drugs necessarily leads to a massive addiction problem. The principle
may hold true for some countries, but not for all.
The converse of this principle, however, seems to be inevitably true. When
drugs are not available, there can be no drug consumption. The traditional method
of decreasing the availability of drugs has been through repressive drug control
laws. For the theorists who question whether repressive drug laws actually work,
the experiences in Iran between 1955 and 1969 are illuminating. It was during
this period that Iran imposed harsh drug control laws, outlawing domestic opium
production and consumption. As far as the production of opium in Iran is con-
480. See Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 80, at 9, 19.
481. Although Iranians tend to be Shia Moslems while the Turks and Afghans tend to
be Sunnis, there does not seem to be any direct correlation between opium abuse and partic-
ular Moslem sects. Certain of the nomadic tribes in Iran who are Shias do not use opium.
For a description of the historical differences between Shias and Sunnis see WIInmt, supra
note 5, at 198-202. Because nomadic tribes tend not to use opium, some suggest that opium
use in Iran may be related to a settled environment. Field study.
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cerned, the prohibition laws of 1955 did work. What is more, they worked in
spite of the economic and political dislocations that the opium production ban
caused. That the ban did work, and worked well, despite these formidable ob-
stacles demonstrates that the control of opium cultivation at the field site is a man-
ageable objective of a law enforcement system.
When one moves from the domestic production to the domestic consumption
of opium, however, the effect of repressive drug laws is not as clear. It does
seem true that the 1955 law did reduce the number of addicts in Iran. The ad-
diction figure prior to 1955 was estimated to be approximately 1.5 million; after
1955, the estimate dropped to approximately 400,000. But the law did not suc-
ceed in forcing this hard core of 400,000 addicts to stop taking opium.
The explanation of this phenomenon probably lies in the fact that opium users,
like all other drug users, are not a homogenous group. There are marginal users,
medical users, social users and compulsive users, to name but a few. 48 2 One
1955 study of hospitalized addicts in Iran showed that 41 percent of these ad-
dicts had begun using opium for medical reasons, 17 percent for relief from work-
related fatigue and stress, 23 percent for the psychological enjoyment it brought,
and 19 percent for various other reasons. 483 Some of the addicts who did choose
to abandon their habits did so simply because the government made opium use
criminal. 484 They were joined by others who gave up their habits because opium
was now more difficult and more dangerous to obtain."8 5 Yet a third group-
the hard core drug users-was deterred neither by the injunction of the law nor
by the risks of possible apprehension and incarceration.486 These were the opium
users who either would not or could not abandon their habit.
It would be instructive to know whether the bulk of this resistant population
was composed of individuals who simply could not abandon their addiction or
individuals who chose to flauait the law. If this resistant group was comprised
of those who could not abandon their habits, adequate rehabilitation facilities
might have had some effect. But in 1955 the limited rehabilitative assistance that
was available was effectively confined to detoxification; there was no adequate
counseling or after-care support available. In the minds of at least some of the
reformers, the failure to provide adequate rehabilitation led to the collapse of
the entire prohibition effort.487
For whatever reason, the prohibition laws of 1955 did not eradicate hard core
addiction in Iran. This fact does not imply, however, that repressive legislation
can never effectively control drug consumption. However, in order to work the
repression must be total-something that is normally difficult to achieve except in
482. For a "typology of drug-using behavior" see NATIONAL COMM. ON MARIHUANA AND
DRuo ABUnS, SECOND REPORT ON DRUG UsE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 93-
98 (1973).
483. See The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 3.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Field study.
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a tightly contained environment such as a clinic or a prison. Even in these en-
vironments, complete control over drug consumption is difficult and expensive
to achieve; where the area to be contained is an entire nation, the problem is in-
finitely more complex. Moreover, if Iran could have effectively cleaned its own
house of domestic opium, its doors and windows were still open to illicit imports
from Russia, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
International cooperation was obviously necessary if Iran was to be successful
in suppressing drug consumption entirely. Perhaps it was unrealistic to have
hoped for such cooperation. Because of its oil revenues, Iran could prohibit
opium production and take the attendant economic dislocation in stride; such
would not be the case in Turkey and Afghanistan. Thus the pull of the lucrative
Iranian market and the push of economic need resulted in a steady flow of foreign
opium into Iran from the west and the east.
With an effective system of total prohibition rendered impossible, Iran was left
with laws which did not, and perhaps could not, function as intended. The result
was a series of disturbing (but predictable) consequences which gradually forced
Iran to alter its drug strategy once again. These consequences can be outlined as
follows.
A. The Growth of a Black Market
The prohibition laws of 1955 forced the hard core addict to find new sources
of supply, so he turned to opium from Turkey and Afghanistan. For the Iranian
addict it was a short step from using to peddling these smuggled drugs. The
decision to peddle drugs is critical because the addict now inserts himself into the
illegal distribution system, fostering the further spread of drug abuse. Unquestion-
ably, Iranians were involved in the distribution of smuggled drugs both at this low
level in the hierarchy and at higher levels. 488 A black market retail system
requires planning, financing, detailed arrangements, and local distribution points,
just like any legitimate retail system. Illegal systems once built are quite adaptable
and difficult to dismantle.
An extensive black market in drugs has an important effect on the incidence
of corruption among government officials. It is undoubtedly true that there were
instances of official corruption in Iran revolving around illicit drug traffic, although
precise information is difficult to obtain. It is known, however, that one of the
first individuals executed under the new 1969 drug law was a military officer.48 9
As has already been suggested, executions often carry messages to the Iranian
people. The message of this execution was clear-any official who involved him-
self in the illicit drug traffic would not be spared. From this fact one might infer
that one of the things the Iranians have learned from their efforts to end drug
abuse is that no program can succeed as long as corruption among those respon-
sible for administering it is tolerated.
488. Field study.
489. The Fight Against Narcotics, supra note 14, at 10,
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B. Economic and Human Costs
In addition to precipitating a large black market, the prohibition laws caused
severe economic and human hardships. The outflow of gold and money to pay
for smuggled opium had an adverse effect on Iran's international balance of pay-
ments.
If the cost of prohibition was expensive in economic terms, the human costs
were even higher. Because of strict law enforcement measures, the jails and pris-
ons in Iran began to fill with addicts who were caught distributing drugs. Not
only did the costs incident to apprehension and incarceration begin to increase,
but for every Iranian arrested there was often a family left without a source of in-
come. The harder the police pressed their campaign against the domestic opium
user, the more severe the economic pressure became at the family level.
By 1969 the government of Iran had become convinced that its ban on opium
production and consumption was not achieving its objective, and that a new policy
was required. It would be incorrect, however, to describe Iran's post-1969 drug
strategy as a break with the strategy of repression that characterized the 1955-69
period. The new measures did attempt to deal more effectively with the black
market and its attendant problems. In attacking the black market the Iranian gov-
ernment recognized that it was built on two basic components: the estimated
400,000 domestic addicts who were ready, willing, and able to buy smuggled
drugs (the demand), and the black marketeers who were introducing these smug-
gled drugs into the Iranian market (the supply).
In order to attack the domestic demand for opium, the government divided its
drug consumption population into two segments. One segment consisted of those
who were judged incapable cf abandoning their drug dependence because of
their age or their physical condition; the other segment consisted of those who
were judged capable of abandoning their habits.
As for the first group of addicts, those adjudged incapable of giving up their
habits, the government decided to supply them with domestic opium under con-
trolled conditions in the context of a governmental opium maintenance program.
To secure the opium necessary to supply the maintenance program, Iran reinsti-
tuted limited cultivation of the. poppy. In addition, the government also fun-
neled a certain amount of seized opium into the maintenance program. In order
to weaken the demand for illegal opium, the government retailed this opium at
prices competitive with illegal opium.
Of course, the reinstitution of poppy cultivation, even on a limited scale, pre-
sented certain risks. Poppy cultivation might spread beyond assigned limits and
domestic opium might find its way into the black market, thereby exacerbating
rather than solving the problem. To diminish such risks, the government relied
on two devices. The first was a rigid licensing, control, and supervision system
which made illegal cultivation and diversion extremely difficult. The second was
a policy of paying the farmer a higher price for his opium than the illegal dis-
tributor could pay.
All things considered, the government's program of supplying the opium needs
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of addicts who could not abandon their habits seems to be working reasonably
well. Presently over 100,000 addicts have joined the government program. As
a result, approximately 20 percent of the drug consumption population has been
shifted from the black market to a legal opium supply.
With regard to the second segment of its drug consumption population, the
approximately 300,000 addicts who still rely on the black market for their drugs,
the Iranian government continued to treat them as criminals-at least in theory.
In practice, however, the government was aware that if this criminalization policy
had failed in 1955, it was unlikely to work in 1969. While not totally abandoning
the threat of criminal penalties, Iran decided to make a serious attempt at reha-
bilitating many of these addicts. The theory was that those who were capable
of abandoning their habits would do so if adequate detoxification and after-care
facilities were open to them. If their motivation was weak, there was always
the pressure of civil and criminal penalties to strengthen their resolve.
In theory the strategy seems sound, but in practice a functioning rehabilitation
program has yet to get off the ground. The bnly special hospital for addicts in
the entire country continues to be the Vanak Clinic in Teheran; even in this
clinic, after-care programs are minimal at best. Although six large rehabilita-
tion centers are planned, there does not seem to be the trained cadre of profes-
sionals needed to staff them. The result is that a large hard core addict popula-
tion remains-still ready to buy smuggled opium.
The existence of both a legal maintenance program and an illegal black mar-
ket has produced some unforeseen results. First, with the legalization of limited
opium consumption, attitudes regarding opium consumption have changed. Opium
usage is no longer all bad; it is good or bad, legal or illegal, depending on
whether you are a registered addict. Second, the presence of a legal supply
of opium in the country has made it more difficult for police to identify and
seize illegal opium. The peddler of illegal opium can use a government card to
justify his possession of opium while a single registered addict in a roomfull of
users may be enough to "legitimatize," the pipe and all the opium on the premises.
Third, diversion from the legal market into the illegal market is inevitable. In
fact, limited diversion from the legal market may be acceptable to the govern-
ment because it further weakens the demand for smuggled opium.
With a shift in basic attitudes towards opium use, hampered law enforcement
efforts, and diversion of legal opium into the illegal market, the stage could be
set for a new increase in the size of the drug consumption population. Levels of
addiction are not static, much less self-contained. This possibility remains the
chief worry of many as they view the operation of the laws of 1969. The threat
of mounting levels of addiction is all the more real because there is no drug
education program that might check any such increase. The reformers of 1969,
unlike their counterparts in 1955, view drug education as spreading rather than
containing addiction.
While the efforts of the Iranian government to undercut market demand for
smuggled opium may only be partially successful, its attack on the source of
supply, the smuggler himself, may ultimately prove more successful. The strat-
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egy to discourage smuggling is two-pronged: first, the government has increased
its law enforcement capabilities on the borders, and second, it has introduced
summary military trial and execution for convicted traffickers.
The strategy has already had some effect on the Turkish border. The more
affluent Turks will not readily run the risks of smuggling-particularly when
capture means execution by a military firing squad. Of course, smuggling over
the Turkish frontier has not completely stopped. The smuggler, however, has
been forced to turn to importing less detectable morphine base rather than opium.
On the Afghan border, however, the death penalty has not decreased smug-
gling. If anything, the threat of capital punishment has made the Afghan smug-
glers more dangerous. They have heavily armed themselves and have little reason
to surrender when cornered. Increased helicopter and motorcycle surveillance
will undoubtedly reduce Afghan smuggling somewhat, but no one in Iran be-
lieves that drug smuggling can be seriously curtailed until the Afghan govern-
ment has the wherewithal and the resolve to cooperate in the venture. The pic-
ture here seems bleak.
The experience of Iran reveals in dramatic form the complexity of the problem
of narcotics control. Far from being a straightforward legal problem amenable
to solutions by an adjustment of local laws, it involves an interplay of social,
economic, medical and political forces that seem to defy any simple analysis.
To its credit, Iran has made serious and often costly efforts to control its drug
problem. Each has borne within itself the seeds of its own defeat. Defeats,
however, are no less instructive than successes, and are perhaps more so. It is
from reflecting upon both that one achieves some understanding of how law func-
tions when applied to the narcotics problem. So viewed, the history of Iran's
attempts at using legal institutions to control its drug problem carries lessons for
us all.
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